Related papers: The Revealed Preference Theory of Aggregate Object…

The problem of designing a profit-maximizing, Bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism with flexible consumers and costly heterogeneous supply is considered. In our setup, each consumer is associated with a…

This paper is devoted to revealed preference theory and its applications to testing economic data for consistency with utility maximization hypothesis, construction of index numbers, and forecasting. The quantitative measures of…

A collection of objects, some of which are good and some are bad, is to be divided fairly among agents with different tastes, modeled by additive utility functions. If the objects cannot be shared, so that each of them must be entirely…

We study the problem of fairly allocating either a set of indivisible goods or a set of mixed divisible and indivisible goods (i.e., mixed goods) to agents with additive utilities, taking the best-of-both-worlds perspective of guaranteeing…

We consider a private variant of the classical allocation problem: given k goods and n agents with individual, private valuation functions over bundles of goods, how can we partition the goods amongst the agents to maximize social welfare?…

Combinatorial auctions where agents can bid on bundles of items are desirable because they allow the agents to express complementarity and substitutability between the items. However, expressing one's preferences can require bidding on all…

Point-of-Interest (POI) recommender systems provide personalized recommendations to users and help businesses attract potential customers. Despite their success, recent studies suggest that highly data-driven recommendations could be…

We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among a set of agents in a fair and efficient manner. An allocation is said to be fair if it is envy-free up to one good (EF1), which means that each agent prefers its own bundle…

We study the fairness of dimensionality reduction methods for recommendations. We focus on the fundamental method of principal component analysis (PCA), which identifies latent components and produces a low-rank approximation via the…

We study the assignment problem of objects to agents with heterogeneous preferences under distributional constraints. Each agent is associated with a publicly known type and has a private ordinal ranking over objects. We are interested in…

When aggregating Subjective Expected Utility preferences, the Pareto principle leads to an impossibility result unless the individuals have a common belief. This paper examines the source of this impossibility in more detail by considering…

We study the fair allocation of undesirable indivisible items, or chores. While the case of desirable indivisible items (or goods) is extensively studied, with many results known for different notions of fairness, less is known about the…

Many-to-many matching with contracts is studied in the framework of revealed preferences. All preferences are described by choice functions that satisfy natural conditions. Under a no-externality assumption individual preferences can be…

We focus on the problem of ranking $N$ objects starting from a set of noisy pairwise comparisons provided by a crowd of unequal workers, each worker being characterized by a specific degree of reliability, which reflects her ability to rank…

An observer wants to understand a decision-maker's welfare from her choice. She believes that decisions are made under limited attention. We argue that the standard model of limited attention cannot help the observer greatly. To address…

We present an extension-based approach for computing and verifying preferences in an abstract argumentation system. Although numerous argumentation semantics have been developed previously for identifying acceptable sets of arguments from…

We revisit the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for allocating divisible items among two agents who have linear utilities, where payments are disallowed and there is no prior information on the agents' preferences. The…

For object reallocation problems, if preferences are strict but otherwise unrestricted, the Top Trading Cycles rule (TTC) is the leading rule: It is the only rule satisfying efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness.…

We consider a practically motivated variant of the canonical online fair allocation problem: a decision-maker has a budget of perishable resources to allocate over a fixed number of rounds. Each round sees a random number of arrivals, and…

We study the fair division of items to agents supposing that agents can form groups. We thus give natural generalizations of popular concepts such as envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency to groups of fixed sizes. Group envy-freeness requires…