Related papers: The Revealed Preference Theory of Aggregate Object…
We study the fair allocation of indivisible resources among agents. Most prior work focuses on fairness and/or efficiency among agents. However, the allocator, as the resource owner, may also be involved in many scenarios (e.g., government…
We study fair division of divisible goods under generalized assignment constraints. Here, each good has an agent-specific value and size, and every agent has a budget constraint that limits the total size of the goods she can receive. Since…
We consider the fundamental problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among strategic agents with additive valuation functions. It is well known that, in the absence of monetary transfers, Pareto efficient and truthful rules are…
In problems involving the allocation of a single non-disposable commodity, we study rules defined on a general domain of preferences requiring only that each preference exhibit a unique global maximum. Our focus is on rules that satisfy a…
Mechanism design is addressed in the context of fair allocations of indivisible goods with monetary compensation. Motivated by a real-world social choice problem, mechanisms with verification are considered in a setting where (i) agents'…
We study the probabilistic assignment of items to platforms that satisfies both group and individual fairness constraints. Each item belongs to specific groups and has a preference ordering over platforms. Each platform enforces group…
A fundamental resource allocation setting is the random assignment problem in which agents express preferences over objects that are then randomly allocated to the agents. In 2001, Bogomolnaia and Moulin presented the probabilistic serial…
We consider the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating indivisible items (goods or bads) under capacity constraints. In this setting, we are given a set of categorized items. Each category has a capacity constraint (the same for all…
Competitive equilibrium with equal income (CEEI) is considered one of the best mechanisms to allocate a set of items among agents fairly and efficiently. In this paper, we study the computation of CEEI when items are chores that are…
We study the object reallocation problem under strict preferences. On the unrestricted domain, Ekici (2024) showed that the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism is the unique mechanism that is individually rational, pair efficient, and…
We examine how the empirical content of revealed preference theory depends on the dimensionality of the choice environment. While higher-dimensional choice problems may appear more demanding, we show that revealed preference restrictions…
We study the fair and truthful allocation of m divisible public items among n agents, each with distinct preferences for the items. To aggregate agents' preferences fairly, we focus on finding a core solution. For divisible items, a core…
Equitable allocation of indivisible items involves partitioning the items among agents such that everyone derives (almost) equal utility. We consider the approximate notion of \textit{equitability up to one item} (EQ1) and focus on the…
We consider the discrete assignment problem in which agents express ordinal preferences over objects and these objects are allocated to the agents in a fair manner. We use the stochastic dominance relation between fractional or randomized…
The design of optimal auctions is a problem of interest in economics, game theory and computer science. Despite decades of effort, strategyproof, revenue-maximizing auction designs are still not known outside of restricted settings.…
It has been shown that dimension reduction methods such as PCA may be inherently prone to unfairness and treat data from different sensitive groups such as race, color, sex, etc., unfairly. In pursuit of fairness-enhancing dimensionality…
We study the problem of exchange when 1) agents are endowed with heterogeneous indivisible objects, and 2) there is no money. In general, no rule satisfies the three central properties Pareto-efficiency, individual rationality, and…
Mechanism design in resource allocation studies dividing limited resources among self-interested agents whose satisfaction with the allocation depends on privately held utilities. We consider the problem in a payment-free setting, with the…
Preference aggregation is a core operation in multi-objective design optimisation and group decision-making, as it determines the best-fit-for-common-purpose alternative within complex socio-technical contexts. Therefore, their aggregation…
We consider the problem of fairly allocating a combination of divisible and indivisible goods. While fairness criteria like envy-freeness (EF) and proportionality (PROP) can always be achieved for divisible goods, only their relaxed…