Related papers: Public Goods Provision in Directed Networks: A Ker…

This paper considers incentives to provide goods that are partially shareable along social links. We introduce a model in which each individual in a social network not only decides how much of a shareable good to provide, but also decides…

We consider the provision of public goods on networks of strategic agents. We study different effort outcomes of these network games, namely, the Nash equilibria, Pareto efficient effort profiles, and semi-cooperative equilibria (effort…

Recently Bramoulle and Kranton presented a model for the provision of public goods over a network and showed the existence of a class of Nash equilibria called specialized equilibria wherein some agents exert maximum effort while other…

Public goods games study the incentives of individuals to contribute to a public good and their behaviors in equilibria. In this paper, we examine a specific type of public goods game where players are networked and each has binary actions,…

In this paper we study resource allocation in decentralized information local public good networks. A network is a local public good network if each user's actions directly affect the utility of an arbitrary subset of network users. We…

In a public goods game, every player chooses whether or not to buy a good that all neighboring players will have access to. We consider a setting in which the good is indivisible, neighboring players are out-neighbors in a directed graph,…

Public goods games in undirected networks are generally known to have pure Nash equilibria, which are easy to find. In contrast, we prove that, in directed networks, a broad range of public goods games have intractable equilibrium problems:…

This paper considers a game-theoretic framework for distributed machine learning problems over networks where the information acquisition at a node is modeled as a rational choice of a player. In the proposed game, players decide both the…

We explore stability and fairness considerations in decentralized networked markets with bilateral contracts, building on the trading networks framework [Hatfield et al., 2013]. In our trading network game, we show that a well-defined…

We study public goods games played on networks with possibly non-reciprocal relationships between players. Examples for this type of interactions include one-sided relationships, mutual but unequal relationships, and parasitism. It is well…

In the Binary Networked Public Goods game, every player needs to decide if she participates in a public project whose utility is shared equally by the community. We study the problem of deciding if there exists a pure strategy Nash…

With the proliferation of distributed generations, traditional passive consumers in distribution networks are evolving into "prosumers", which can both produce and consume energy. Energy trading with the main grid or between prosumers is…

We study the complexity of computing equilibria in binary public goods games on undirected graphs. In such a game, players correspond to vertices in a graph and face a binary choice of performing an action, or not. Each player's decision…

We study the computational complexity of "public goods games on networks". In this model, each vertex in a graph is an agent that needs to take a binary decision of whether to "produce a good" or not. Each agent's utility depends on the…

We propose fully-distributed algorithms for Nash equilibrium seeking in aggregative games over networks. We first consider the case where local constraints are present and we design an algorithm combining, for each agent, (i) the projected…

We consider an environment where players are involved in a public goods game and must decide repeatedly whether to make an individual contribution or not. However, players lack strategically relevant information about the game and about the…

Motivated by the complex dynamics of cooperative and competitive interactions within networked agent systems, multi-cluster games provide a framework for modeling the interconnected goals of self-interested clusters of agents. For this…

Securely and efficiently procuring energy balancing services in distribution networks remains challenging, especially within a privacy-preserving environment. This paper proposes a network-constrained demand response game, i.e., a…

Existing settings of decentralized learning either require players to have full information or the system to have certain special structure that may be hard to check and hinder their applicability to practical systems. To overcome this, we…

Continuous-time gradient-based Nash equilibrium seeking algorithms enjoy a passivity property under a suitable monotonicity assumption. This feature has been exploited to design distributed algorithms that converge to Nash equilibria and…