Related papers: Diversity in Schumpeterian games
Evolutionary game dynamics is one of the most fruitful frameworks for studying evolution in different disciplines, from Biology to Economics. Within this context, the approach of choice for many researchers is the so-called replicator…
The processes and mechanisms underlying the origin and maintenance of biological diversity have long been of central importance in ecology and evolution. The competitive exclusion principle states that the number of coexisting species is…
Evolution is based on the assumption that competing players update their strategies to increase their individual payoffs. However, while the applied updating method can be different, most of previous works proposed uniform models where…
Open data, as an essential element in the sustainable development of the digital economy, is highly valued by many relevant sectors in the implementation process. However, most studies suppose that there are only data providers and users in…
Recent experimental results with humans involved in social dilemma games suggest that cooperation may be a contagious phenomenon and that the selection pressure operating on evolutionary dynamics (i.e., mimicry) is relatively weak. I…
Frequency dependent selection and demographic fluctuations play important roles in evolutionary and ecological processes. Under frequency dependent selection, the average fitness of the population may increase or decrease based on…
Game theory research on the snowdrift game has showed that gradual evolution of the continuously varying level of cooperation in joint enterprises can demonstrate evolutionary merging as well as evolutionary branching. However, little is…
Motivated by the fact that the same social dilemma can be perceived differently by different players, we here study evolutionary multigames in structured populations. While the core game is the weak prisoner's dilemma, a fraction of the…
When group members claim a portion of limited resources, it is tempting to invest more effort to get a larger share. However, if everyone acts similarly, they all get the same piece they would obtain without extra effort. This is the…
We examine kinetic symmetry breaking phenomena in an evolutionary political game in which voters, inhabiting a multidimensional ideological space, cast ballots via selection mechanisms subject to the competing forces of conformity and…
The evolutionary dynamics of the Public Goods game addresses the emergence of cooperation within groups of individuals. However, the Public Goods game on large populations of interconnected individuals has been usually modeled without any…
This paper explores the Coevolutionary Optional Prisoner's Dilemma (COPD) game, which is a simple model to coevolve game strategy and link weights of agents playing the Optional Prisoner's Dilemma game. We consider a population of agents…
Societies consisting of cooperative individuals seem to require for their continuing success that defectors be policed. The precise connection between punishers and benefits, population structure, and division of labour, however, remains…
Evolutionary game theory has been widely used to study the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas where imitation-led strategy updates are typically assumed. However, results of recent behavioral experiments are not compatible with the…
In traditional voter models, opinion dynamics are driven by interactions between individuals, where an individual adopts the opinion of a randomly chosen neighbor. However, these models often fail to capture the emergence of entirely new…
Evolutionary dynamics can be studied in well-mixed or structured populations. Population structure typically arises from the heterogeneous distribution of individuals in physical space or on social networks. Here we introduce a new type of…
We study the evolution of cooperation in a finite population interacting according to a simple model of like-with-like assortment. Evolution proceeds as a Moran process, and payoffs from the underlying cooperator-defector game are…
Ecologists and economists try to explain collective behavior in terms of competitive systems of selfish individuals with the ability to learn from the past. Statistical physicists have been investigating models which might contribute to the…
Evolutionary game dynamics describes not only frequency dependent genetical evolution, but also cultural evolution in humans. In this context, successful strategies spread by imitation. It has been shown that the details of strategy update…
We consider a version of large population games whose agents compete for resources using strategies with adaptable preferences. Diversity among the agents reduces their maladpative behavior. We find interesting scaling relations with…