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Since autonomous coding agents generate complex behaviors at high-volume, we may want to use other LLMs to monitor actions to reduce the risk from dangerous misaligned behavior. To better understand the limitations of such monitors against…
AI agents increasingly call external tools (file system, network, APIs) through the Model Context Protocol (MCP). These tool calls are the agent's syscalls -- privileged operations with side effects on shared state -- yet today's safety…
One major factor impeding more widespread adoption of deep neural networks (DNNs) is their lack of robustness, which is essential for safety-critical applications such as autonomous driving. This has motivated much recent work on…
As single-cell RNA sequencing datasets grow in adoption, scale, and complexity, data analysis remains a bottleneck for many research groups. Although frontier AI agents have improved dramatically at software engineering and general data…
We introduce ARACNE, a fully autonomous LLM-based pentesting agent tailored for SSH services that can execute commands on real Linux shell systems. Introduces a new agent architecture with multi-LLM model support. Experiments show that…
Autonomous AI agents powered by Large Language Models can reason, plan, and execute complex tasks, but their ability to autonomously retrieve information and run code introduces significant security risks. Existing approaches attempt to…
Maintaining reliable UI test suites in large-scale enterprise applications is a persistent and costly challenge. We present an industrial case study of a multi-agent autonomous testing system evaluated using anonymized execution data from a…
Computer-use agents (CUAs) that interact with real computer systems can perform automated tasks but face critical safety risks. Ambiguous instructions may trigger harmful actions, and adversarial users can manipulate tool execution to…
Enterprises are rapidly deploying large language models, retrieval augmented generation pipelines, and tool using agents into production, often on shared high performance computing clusters and cloud accelerator platforms that also support…
This chapter formulates seven lessons for preventing harm in artificial intelligence (AI) systems based on insights from the field of system safety for software-based automation in safety-critical domains. New applications of AI across…
AI agents are increasingly deployed in multi-tenant cloud environments, where they execute diverse tool calls within sandboxed containers, each call with distinct resource demands and rapid fluctuations. We present a systematic…
AI agents have been boosted by large language models. AI agents can function as intelligent assistants and complete tasks on behalf of their users with access to tools and the ability to execute commands in their environments. Through…
Warning: This paper contains examples of harmful language, and reader discretion is recommended. The increasing open release of powerful large language models (LLMs) has facilitated the development of downstream applications by reducing the…
Frontier AI agents may pursue hidden goals while concealing their pursuit from oversight. Alignment training aims to prevent such behavior by reinforcing the correct goals, but alignment may not always succeed and can lead to unwanted side…
Despite their growing adoption across domains, large language model (LLM)-powered agents face significant security risks from backdoor attacks during training and fine-tuning. These compromised agents can subsequently be manipulated to…
Sufficiently capable models could subvert human oversight and decision-making in important contexts. For example, in the context of AI development, models could covertly sabotage efforts to evaluate their own dangerous capabilities, to…
Developers spend roughly one-tenth of their workday writing code, yet most AI tooling targets that fraction. This paper asks what should be built for the rest. We surveyed 860 Microsoft developers to understand where they want AI support,…
Prompt injection attacks, where untrusted data contains an injected prompt to manipulate the system, have been listed as the top security threat to LLM-integrated applications. Model-level prompt injection defenses have shown strong…
Large language model (LLM) agents are vulnerable to prompt-injection attacks that propagate through multi-step workflows, tool interactions, and persistent context, making input-output filtering alone insufficient for reliable protection.…
AI agents, specifically powered by large language models, have demonstrated exceptional capabilities in various applications where precision and efficacy are necessary. However, these agents come with inherent risks, including the potential…