Related papers: On Sybil Proofness in Competitive Combinatorial Ex…
Permissionless systems resist Sybil attacks by binding influence to scarce resources. We show that scarcity alone is insufficient: the structural properties of the resource determine whether influence can be concentrated at sublinear cost…
We show that in the single-parameter mechanism design environment, the only non-wasteful, symmetric, incentive compatible and Sybil-proof direct mechanism is a second price auction with symmetric tie-breaking. Thus, if there is private…
In the realm of cost-sharing mechanisms, the vulnerability to Sybil strategies -- also known as false-name strategies, where agents create fake identities to manipulate outcomes -- has not yet been studied. In this paper, we delve into the…
Restaking protocols expand validator responsibilities beyond consensus, but their security depends on resistance to Sybil attacks. We introduce a formal framework for Sybil-proofness in restaking networks, distinguishing between two types…
Existing centralised market places such as Ebay enable companies to gather large amounts of personal data that can be used to manipulate users. Furthermore, users can frequently perform fraud without severe consequence. Reputation systems…
This paper addresses the problem of energy sharing between a population of price-taking agents who adopt decentralized primal-dual gradient dynamics to find the Competitive Equilibrium (CE). Although the CE is efficient, it does not ensure…
Consider a mechanism that cannot observe how many players there are directly, but instead must rely on their self-reports to know how many are participating. Suppose the players can create new identities to report to the auctioneer at some…
In robust decision making under uncertainty, a natural choice is to go with safety (aka security) level strategies. However, in many important cases, most notably auctions, there is a large multitude of safety level strategies, thus making…
Sybil resistance is a key requirement of decentralized consensus protocols. It is achieved by introducing a scarce resource (such as computational power, monetary stake, disk space, etc.), which prevents participants from costlessly…
We study a question answering problem on a social network, where a requester is seeking an answer from the agents on the network. The goal is to design reward mechanisms to incentivize the agents to propagate the requester's query to their…
Advances in computational optimization allow for the organization of large combinatorial markets. We aim for allocations and competitive equilibrium prices, i.e. outcomes that are in the core. The research is motivated by the design of…
The incentive ratio measures the utility gains from strategic behaviour. Without any restrictions on the setup, ratios for linear, Leontief and Cobb-Douglas exchange markets are unbounded, showing that manipulating the equilibrium is a…
A Sybil attack occurs when an adversary controls multiple identifiers (IDs) in a system. Limiting the number of Sybil (bad) IDs to a minority is critical to the use of well-established tools for tolerating malicious behavior, such as…
Proof of Stake (PoS) is a burgeoning Sybil resistance mechanism that aims to have a digital asset ("token") serve as security collateral in crypto networks. However, PoS has so far eluded a comprehensive threat model that encompasses both…
A diffusion auction is a market to sell commodities over a social network, where the challenge is to incentivize existing buyers to invite their neighbors in the network to join the market. Existing mechanisms have been designed to solve…
This paper explores the bifurcative dynamics of an artificial stock market exchange (ASME) with endogenous, myopic traders interacting through a limit order book (LOB). We showed that agent-based price dynamics possess intrinsic…
In federated learning, machine learning and deep learning models are trained globally on distributed devices. The state-of-the-art privacy-preserving technique in the context of federated learning is user-level differential privacy.…
Many distributed systems are subject to the Sybil attack, where an adversary subverts system operation by emulating behavior of multiple distinct nodes. Most recent work to address this problem leverages social networks to establish trust…
Game-theoretic analyses of distributed and peer-to-peer systems typically use the Nash equilibrium solution concept, but this explicitly excludes the possibility of strategic behavior involving more than one agent. We examine the effects of…
In this paper, we study incentive mechanisms for retrieving information from networked agents. Following the model in [Kleinberg and Raghavan 2005], the agents are represented as nodes in an infinite tree, which is generated by a random…