Related papers: On Sybil Proofness in Competitive Combinatorial Ex…
As systems trend toward superintelligence, a natural modeling premise is that agents can self-improve along every facet of their own design. We formalize this with a five-axis decomposition and a decision layer, separating incentives from…
We present a model describing the competition between information transmission and decision making in financial markets. The solution of this simple model is recalled, and possible variations discussed. It is shown numerically that despite…
In many online domains, Sybil networks -- or cases where a single user assumes multiple identities -- is a pervasive feature. This complicates experiments, as off-the-shelf regression estimators at least assume known network topologies (if…
We investigate a spectrum oligopoly market where each primary seeks to sell secondary access to its channel at multiple locations. Transmission qualities of a channel evolve randomly. Each primary needs to select a price and a set of…
We present a framework for upper bounding the number of iterations required by first-order optimization algorithms implementing constrained LQR controllers. We derive new bounds for the condition number and extremal eigenvalues of the…
We develop a game-theoretic framework for the study of competition between firms who have budgets to "seed" the initial adoption of their products by consumers located in a social network. The payoffs to the firms are the eventual number of…
We study competitive equilibrium in the canonical Fisher market model, but with indivisible goods. In this model, every agent has a budget of artificial currency with which to purchase bundles of goods. Equilibrium prices match between…
Competitive equilibrium (CE) is a fundamental concept in market economics. Its efficiency and fairness properties make it particularly appealing as a rule for fair allocation of resources among agents with possibly different entitlements.…
We investigate a spectrum oligopoly where primary users allow secondary access in lieu of financial remuneration. Transmission qualities of the licensed bands fluctuate randomly. Each primary needs to select the price of its channel with…
We study a market mechanism that sets edge prices to incentivize strategic agents to efficiently share limited network capacity. In this market, agents form coalitions, with each coalition sharing a unit capacity of a selected route and…
Deep ensembles perform better than a single network thanks to the diversity among their members. Recent approaches regularize predictions to increase diversity; however, they also drastically decrease individual members' performances. In…
The quality of learning generally improves with the scale and diversity of data. Companies and institutions can therefore benefit from building models over shared data. Many cloud and blockchain platforms, as well as government initiatives,…
We present a methodology to robustly estimate the competitive equilibria (CE) of combinatorial markets under the assumption that buyers do not know their precise valuations for bundles of goods, but instead can only provide noisy estimates.…
We examine the dynamics of informational efficiency in a market with asymmetrically informed, boundedly rational traders who adaptively learn optimal strategies using simple multiarmed bandit (MAB) algorithms. The strategies available to…
We study the problem of designing mechanisms for trading networks that satisfy four desired properties: dominant-strategy incentive compatibility, efficiency, weak budget balance (WBB), and individual rationality (IR). Although there exist…
This paper explores reward mechanisms for a query incentive network in which agents seek information from social networks. In a query tree issued by the task owner, each agent is rewarded by the owner for contributing to the solution, for…
Randomized ensemble classifiers (RECs), where one classifier is randomly selected during inference, have emerged as an attractive alternative to traditional ensembling methods for realizing adversarially robust classifiers with limited…
We extend the "No-dynamic-arbitrage and market impact"-framework of Jim Gatheral [Quantitative Finance, 10(7): 749-759 (2010)] to the multi-dimensional case where trading in one asset has a cross-impact on the price of other assets. From…
Sybil attacks, in which a large number of adversary-controlled nodes join a network, are a concern for many peer-to-peer database systems, necessitating expensive countermeasures such as proof-of-work. However, there is a category of…
Rank aggregation with pairwise comparisons is widely encountered in sociology, politics, economics, psychology, sports, etc . Given the enormous social impact and the consequent incentives, the potential adversary has a strong motivation to…