Related papers: Optimal Auction Design under Costly Learning
We consider the problem of online dynamic mechanism design for sequential auctions in unknown environments, where the underlying market and, thus, the bidders' values vary over time as interactions between the seller and the bidders…
Building on the linear programming approach to competitive equilibrium pricing, we develop a general method for constructing iterative auctions that achieve Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) outcomes. We show how to transform a linear program…
We study mechanism design in environments where agents have private preferences and private information about a common payoff-relevant state. In such settings with multi-dimensional types, standard mechanisms fail to implement efficient…
We study the optimal auction design problem when bidders' preferences follow the maxmin expected utility model. We suppose that each bidder's set of priors consists of beliefs close to the seller's belief, where "closeness" is defined by a…
We study the revenue-maximizing mechanism when a buyer's value evolves endogenously because of learning-by-consuming. A seller sells one unit of a divisible good, while the buyer relies on his private, rough valuation to choose his…
We propose a novel statistical learning method for multi-item auctions that incorporates credible intervals. Our approach employs nonparametric density estimation to estimate credible intervals for bidder types based on historical data. We…
The enduring value of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism has been highlighted due to its adoption by Facebook ad auctions. Our research delves into its utility in the collaborative virtual goods production (CVGP) game, which finds…
Standard ad auction formats do not immediately extend to settings where multiple size configurations and layouts are available to advertisers. In these settings, the sale of web advertising space increasingly resembles a combinatorial…
This paper studies optimal auction design when valuations depend endogenously on post-auction collaboration between the seller and the winning bidder. Both parties exert non-contractible efforts after the auction, generating a double moral…
We analyze the optimal information design in a click-through auction with fixed valuations per click, but stochastic click-through rates. While the auctioneer takes as given the auction rule of the click-through auction, namely the…
Consider the problem of allocating goods to buyers through an auction. An auction is efficient if the resulting allocation maximizes total welfare, conditional on the information available. If buyers have private values, the…
Device-to-Device communication allows a cellular user (relay node) to relay data between the base station (BS) and another cellular user (destination node). We address the problem of designing reverse auctions to assign a relay node to each…
We present a two stage auction mechanism that renewable generators (or aggregators) could use to allocate renewable energy among LSEs. The auction is conducted day- ahead. LSEs submit bids specifying their valuation per unit, as well as…
Mechanism design, a branch of economics, aims to design rules that can autonomously achieve desired outcomes in resource allocation and public decision making. The research on mechanism design using machine learning is called automated…
This paper studies equilibrium quality of semi-separable position auctions (known as the Ad Types setting) with greedy or optimal allocation combined with generalized second-price (GSP) or Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) pricing. We make three…
In this paper, we take a mechanism design approach to optimal assignment problems with asymmetrically informed buyers. In addition, the surplus generated by an assignment of a buyer to a seller may be adversely affected by externalities…
Existing auction mechanisms are vulnerable to bidder collusion, which substantially degrades revenue and non-colluder welfare. To design truthful mechanisms resilient to collusion, we introduce a novel approach that leverages a machine…
This paper studies an auction design problem for a seller to sell a commodity in a social network, where each individual (the seller or a buyer) can only communicate with her neighbors. The challenge to the seller is to design a mechanism…
We study the information design problem in a single-unit auction setting. The information designer controls independent private signals according to which the buyers infer their binary private values. Assuming that the seller adopts the…
We are interested in mechanisms that maximize social welfare. In [1] this problem was studied for multi-unit auctions with unit demand bidders and for the public project problem, and in each case social welfare undominated mechanisms in the…