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We consider the mean-field game where each agent determines the optimal time to exit the game by solving an optimal stopping problem with reward function depending on the density of the state processes of agents still present in the game.…
We present multilinear and mixed-integer multilinear programs to find a Nash equilibrium in multi-player noncooperative games. We compare the formulations to common algorithms in Gambit, and conclude that a multilinear feasibility program…
We consider quadratic, nonmonotone generalized Nash equilibrium problems with symmetric interactions among the agents. Albeit this class of games is known to admit a potential function, its formal expression can be unavailable in several…
Extensive-form games are a common model for multiagent interactions with imperfect information. In two-player zero-sum games, the typical solution concept is a Nash equilibrium over the unconstrained strategy set for each player. In many…
In many real-world settings agents engage in strategic interactions with multiple opposing agents who can employ a wide variety of strategies. The standard approach for designing agents for such settings is to compute or approximate a…
We present novel techniques for neuro-symbolic concurrent stochastic games, a recently proposed modelling formalism to represent a set of probabilistic agents operating in a continuous-space environment using a combination of neural network…
The goal of agents in multi-agent environments is to maximize total reward against the opposing agents that are encountered. Following a game-theoretic solution concept, such as Nash equilibrium, may obtain a strong performance in some…
We consider two classes of constrained finite state-action stochastic games. First, we consider a two player nonzero sum single controller constrained stochastic game with both average and discounted cost criterion. We consider the same…
In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic solution to the parking problem, by exploiting a strategic-reasoning approach for multi-agent systems. Precisely, cars are modeled by agents interacting among them in a multi-player game setting,…
Multi-agent reinforcement learning, despite its popularity and empirical success, faces significant scalability challenges in large-population dynamic games. Graphon mean field games (GMFGs) offer a principled framework for approximating…
We investigate mean field games for players, who are weakly coupled via their empirical measure. To this end we investigate time-dependent pure jump type propagators over a finite space in the framework of non-linear Markov processes. We…
This paper is concerned with a class of linear-quadratic stochastic large-population problems with partial information, where the individual agent only has access to a noisy observation process related to the state. The dynamics of each…
Decentralised optimisation tasks are important components of multi-agent systems. These tasks can be interpreted as n-player potential games: therefore game-theoretic learning algorithms can be used to solve decentralised optimisation…
We consider the problem of simultaneous learning in stochastic games with many players in the finite-horizon setting. While the typical target solution for a stochastic game is a Nash equilibrium, this is intractable with many players. We…
We consider a two-player linear-state differential game, where one player intervenes continuously in the game, while the other implements an impulse control. When the impulse instants are exogenous, we obtain the classical result in…
For prediction of interacting agents' trajectories, we propose an end-to-end trainable architecture that hybridizes neural nets with game-theoretic reasoning, has interpretable intermediate representations, and transfers to downstream…
Computational aspects of solution notions such as Nash equilibrium have been extensively studied, including settings where the ultimate goal is to find an equilibrium that possesses some additional properties. Furthermore, in order to…
Multiagent learning is a necessary yet challenging problem as multiagent systems become more prevalent and environments become more dynamic. Much of the groundbreaking work in this area draws on notable results from game theory, in…
This letter studies multi-agent reinforcement learning in partially observable Markov potential games. Solving this problem is challenging due to partial observability, decentralized information, and the curse of dimensionality. First, to…
In control system networks, reconfiguration of the controller when agents are leaving or joining the network is still an open challenge, in particular when operation constraints that depend on each agent's behavior must be met. Drawing our…