Related papers: Dynamic Mechanism Collapse: A Boundary Characteriz…
This paper introduces dynamic mechanism design in an elementary fashion. We first examine optimal dynamic mechanisms: We find necessary and sufficient conditions for perfect Bayesian incentive compatibility and formulate the optimal dynamic…
We propose a hidden variable analysis of collapse dynamics in which the state's reduction process may take a finite time $\delta t$. A full characterization of the model is given for the case of black boxes. By introducing nonlocal perfect…
This study introduces an optimal mechanism in a dynamic stochastic knapsack environment. The model features a single seller who has a fixed quantity of a perfectly divisible item. Impatient buyers with a piece-wise linear utility function…
We study Bayesian automated mechanism design in unstructured dynamic environments, where a principal repeatedly interacts with an agent, and takes actions based on the strategic agent's report of the current state of the world. Both the…
We study mechanism design when agents may have hidden secondary goals which will manifest as non-trivial preferences among outcomes for which their primary utility is the same. We show that in such cases, a mechanism is robust against…
The emergence and evolution of real-world systems have been extensively studied in the last few years. However, equally important phenomena are related to the dynamics of systems' collapse, which has been less explored, especially when they…
Using statistical physics methods, we study generative diffusion models in the regime where the dimension of space and the number of data are large, and the score function has been trained optimally. Our analysis reveals three distinct…
We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two…
Dynamic mechanism design is a challenging extension to ordinary mechanism design in which the mechanism designer must make a sequence of decisions over time in the face of possibly untruthful reports of participating agents. Optimizing…
In contextual dynamic pricing, a seller sequentially prices goods based on contextual information. Buyers will purchase products only if the prices are below their valuations. The goal of the seller is to design a pricing strategy that…
We consider a model of bilateral trade with private values. The value of the buyer and the cost of the seller are jointly distributed. The true joint distribution is unknown to the designer, however, the marginal distributions of the value…
Contextual dynamic pricing aims to set personalized prices based on sequential interactions with customers. At each time period, a customer who is interested in purchasing a product comes to the platform. The customer's valuation for the…
We study mechanism design when a designer repeatedly uses a fixed mechanism to interact with strategic agents who learn from observing their allocations. We introduce a static framework, calibrated mechanism design, requiring mechanisms to…
We investigate a social system of agents faced with a binary choice. We assume there is a correct, or beneficial, outcome of this choice. Furthermore, we assume agents are influenced by others in making their decision, and that the agents…
Non-interferometric experiments have been successfully employed to constrain models of spontaneous wave function collapse, which predict a violation of the quantum superposition principle for large systems. These experiments are grounded on…
The basic strategy underlying models of spontaneous wave function collapse (collapse models) is to modify the Schroedinger equation by including nonlinear stochastic terms, which tend to localize wave functions in space in a dynamical…
We discuss a model of spontaneous collapse of the quantum state that does not require adding any stochastic processes to the standard dynamics. The additional ingredient with respect to the wave function is a position in the configuration…
Selling a perfectly divisible item to potential buyers is a fundamental task with apparent applications to pricing communication bandwidth and cloud computing services. Surprisingly, despite the rich literature on single-item auctions,…
A buyer wishes to purchase a durable good from a seller who in each period chooses a mechanism under limited commitment. The buyer's valuation is binary and fully persistent. We show that posted prices implement all equilibrium outcomes of…
We provide a characterization of revenue-optimal dynamic mechanisms in settings where a monopolist sells k items over k periods to a buyer who realizes his value for item i in the beginning of period i. We require that the mechanism…