Related papers: Dynamic Mechanism Collapse: A Boundary Characteriz…
It is well-known that optimal (i.e., revenue-maximizing) selling mechanisms in multidimensional type spaces may involve randomization. We obtain conditions under which deterministic mechanisms are optimal for selling two identical,…
In a typical supervised machine learning setting, the predictions on all test instances are based on a common subset of features discovered during model training. However, using a different subset of features that is most informative for…
We consider the problem of revenue-optimal dynamic mechanism design in settings where agents' types evolve over time as a function of their (both public and private) experience with items that are auctioned repeatedly over an infinite…
We consider the provision of an abstract service to single-dimensional agents. Our model includes position auctions, single-minded combinatorial auctions, and constrained matching markets. When the agents' values are drawn from a…
We propose a new approach to solving dynamic decision problems with rewards that are unbounded below. The approach involves transforming the Bellman equation in order to convert an unbounded problem into a bounded one. The major advantage…
The effective classical/quantum dynamics of a particle constrained on a closed line embedded in a higher dimensional configuration space is analyzed. By considering explicit examples it is shown how different reduction mechanisms produce…
Early warning indicators often suffer from the shortness and coarse-graining of real-world time series. Furthermore, the typically strong and correlated noise contributions in real applications are severe drawbacks for statistical measures.…
A fundamental economic question is that of designing revenue-maximizing mechanisms in dynamic environments. This paper considers a simple yet compelling market model to tackle this question, where forward-looking buyers arrive at the market…
Dynamic pricing of goods in a competitive environment to maximize revenue is a natural objective and has been a subject of research over the years. In this paper, we focus on a class of markets exhibiting the substitutes property with…
The seller's risk-indifference price evaluation is studied. We propose a dynamic risk-indifference pricing criteria derived from a fully-dynamic family of risk measures on the $L_p$-spaces for $p\in [1,\infty]$. The concept of fully-dynamic…
We study Bayesian mechanism design problems in settings where agents have budgets. Specifically, an agent's utility for an outcome is given by his value for the outcome minus any payment he makes to the mechanism, as long as the payment is…
Dynamic facilitation theory assumes short-ranged dynamic constraints to be the essential feature of supercooled liquids and draws much of its conclusions from the study of kinetically constrained models. While deceptively simple, these…
We develop a rigorous theory of external influences on finite discrete dynamical systems, going beyond the perturbation paradigm, in that the external influence need not be a small contribution. Indeed, the covariance condition can be…
This article deals with the realisation of constraints in underdamped Langevin dynamics via soft-constrained dynamics. Specifically, we study systems with a large (or small) parameter that controls the constraint mechanisms, e.g. the…
We provide sufficient conditions for revenue maximization in a two-good monopoly where the buyer's values for the items come from independent (but not necessarily identical) distributions over bounded intervals. Under certain distributional…
Despite the striking successes of deep neural networks trained with gradient-based optimization, these methods differ fundamentally from their biological counterparts. This gap raises key questions about how nature achieves robust,…
In this paper we propose the notion of dynamic deviation measure, as a dynamic time-consistent extension of the (static) notion of deviation measure. To achieve time-consistency we require that a dynamic deviation measures satisfies a…
This paper examines necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of dynamic Groves mechanisms when the domain of valuations is restricted. Our approach is to appropriately define the total valuation function, which is the expected…
An indivisible object may be sold to one of $n$ agents who know their valuations of the object. The seller would like to use a revenue-maximizing mechanism but her knowledge of the valuations' distribution is scarce: she knows only the…
We use martingale and stochastic analysis techniques to study a continuous-time optimal stopping problem, in which the decision maker uses a dynamic convex risk measure to evaluate future rewards. We also find a saddle point for an…