Related papers: Peer Selection with Friends and Enemies
How does information regarding an adversary's intentions affect optimal system design? This paper addresses this question in the context of graphical coordination games where an adversary can indirectly influence the behavior of agents by…
How to optimally persuade an agent who has a private type? When elicitation is feasible, this amounts to a fairly standard principal-agent-style mechanism design problem, where the persuader employs a mechanism to first elicit the agent's…
We study no-money mechanisms for allocating indivisible items to strategic agents with additive preferences under a stochastic model. In this model, items' values are drawn from an underlying distribution and mechanisms are evaluated with…
We analyze an extended model of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma where agents decide to play based on the data from their limited memory or recommendations. The cooperators can decide whether to play with the matched opponent or not. The…
In social decision-making among strategic agents, a universal focus lies on the balance between social and individual interests. Socially efficient mechanisms are thus desirably designed to not only maximize the social welfare but also…
We introduce an approach to deal with self-selection of peers in the linear-in-means model. Contrary to the existing proposals we do not require to specify a model for how the selection of peers comes about. Rather, we exploit two…
In the real world, RL agents should be rewarded for fulfilling human preferences. We show that RL agents implicitly learn the preferences of humans in their environment. Training a classifier to predict if a simulated human's preferences…
We consider the information design problem in spatial resource competition settings. Agents gather at a location deciding whether to move to another location for possibly higher level of resources, and the utility each agent gets by moving…
The way that people make choices or exhibit preferences can be strongly affected by the set of available alternatives, often called the choice set. Furthermore, there are usually heterogeneous preferences, either at an individual level…
Randomized experiments can be susceptible to selection bias due to potential non-compliance by the participants. While much of the existing work has studied compliance as a static behavior, we propose a game-theoretic model to study…
Human interaction relies on a wide range of signals, including non-verbal cues. In order to develop effective Explainable Planning (XAIP) agents it is important that we understand the range and utility of these communication channels. Our…
We introduce the study of sequential information elicitation in strategic multi-agent systems. In an information elicitation setup a center attempts to compute the value of a function based on private information (a-k-a secrets) accessible…
While many multiagent algorithms are designed for homogeneous systems (i.e. all agents are identical), there are important applications which require an agent to coordinate its actions without knowing a priori how the other agents behave.…
The Stable Roommates problem involves matching a set of agents into pairs based on the agents' strict ordinal preference lists. The matching must be stable, meaning that no two agents strictly prefer each other to their assigned partners. A…
Decision making can be difficult when there are many actors (or agents) who may be coordinating or competing to achieve their various ideas of the optimum outcome. Here I present a simple decision making model with an explicitly…
We study information design settings where the designer controls information about a state, and there are multiple agents interacting in a game who are privately informed about their types. Each agent's utility depends on all agents' types…
We study the classical problem of matching $n$ agents to $n$ objects, where the agents have ranked preferences over the objects. We focus on two popular desiderata from the matching literature: Pareto optimality and rank-maximality. Instead…
We study the problem of a planner who resolves risk-return trade-offs - like financial investment decisions - on behalf of a collective of agents with heterogeneous risk preferences. The planner's objective is a two-stage utility functional…
Agents care not only about the outcomes of collective decisions but also about how decisions are made. In many cases, both the outcome and the procedure affect whether agents see a decision as legitimate, justifiable, or acceptable. We…
Imitation is a key component of human social behavior, and is widely used by both children and adults as a way to navigate uncertain or unfamiliar situations. But in an environment populated by multiple heterogeneous agents pursuing…