Related papers: Automated Hardware Trojan Insertion in Industrial-…

High-level synthesis (HLS) is the next emerging trend for designing complex customized architectures for applications such as Machine Learning, Video Processing. It provides a higher level of abstraction and freedom to hardware engineers to…

Traditional learning-based approaches for run-time Hardware Trojan detection require complex and expensive on-chip data acquisition frameworks and thus incur high area and power overhead. To address these challenges, we propose to leverage…

Hardware Trojan detection and protection is becoming more crucial as more untrusted third parties manufacture many parts of critical systems nowadays. The most common way to detect hardware Trojans is comparing the untrusted design with a…

Hardware Trojans have drawn the attention of academia, industry and government agencies. Effective detection mechanisms and countermeasures against such malicious designs can only be developed when there is a deep understanding of how…

Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components are often preferred over custom Integrated Circuits (ICs) to achieve reduced system development time and cost, easy adoption of new technologies, and replaceability. Unfortunately, the integration…

Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) hardware, such as microprocessors, are widely adopted in system design due to their ability to reduce development time and cost compared to custom solutions. However, supply chain entities involved in the…

The risk of hardware Trojans being inserted at various stages of chip production has increased in a zero-trust fabless era. To counter this, various machine learning solutions have been developed for the detection of hardware Trojans. While…

We propose TrojanSAINT, a graph neural network (GNN)-based hardware Trojan (HT) detection scheme working at the gate level. Unlike prior GNN-based art, TrojanSAINT enables both pre-/post-silicon HT detection. TrojanSAINT leverages a…

System-on-chip (SoC) developers increasingly rely on pre-verified hardware intellectual property (IP) blocks acquired from untrusted third-party vendors. These IPs might contain hidden malicious functionalities or hardware Trojans to…

The threat of hardware Trojans (HTs) in security-critical IPs like cryptographic accelerators poses severe security risks. The HT detection methods available today mostly rely on golden models and detailed circuit specifications. Often they…

Third-party intellectual property cores are essential building blocks of modern system-on-chip and integrated circuit designs. However, these design components usually come from vendors of different trust levels and may contain undocumented…

With the rising popularity of machine learning and the ever increasing demand for computational power, there is a growing need for hardware optimized implementations of neural networks and other machine learning models. As the technology…

With the globalization of the semiconductor manufacturing process, electronic devices are powerless against malicious modification of hardware in the supply chain. The ever-increasing threat of hardware Trojan attacks against integrated…

Always-on hardware Trojans pose a serious challenge to integrated circuit trust, as they remain active during normal operation and are difficult to detect in post-deployment settings without trusted golden references. This paper presents a…

Cyber-physical systems rely on sensors, communication, and computing, all powered by integrated circuits (ICs). ICs are largely susceptible to various hardware attacks with malicious intents. One of the stealthiest threats is the insertion…

Logic locking and hardware Trojans are two fields in hardware security that have been mostly developed independently from each other. In this paper, we identify the relationship between these two fields. We find that a common structure that…

Due to the globalization of Integrated Circuit (IC) supply chain, hardware trojans and the attacks that can trigger them have become an important security issue. One type of hardware Trojans leverages the don't care transitions in Finite…

Hardware Trojans (HTs) remain a critical threat because learning-based detectors often overfit to narrow trigger/payload patterns and small, stylized benchmarks. We introduce TrojanGYM, an agentic, LLM-driven framework that automatically…

Recently, it has been shown that deep learning models are vulnerable to Trojan attacks, where an attacker can install a backdoor during training time to make the resultant model misidentify samples contaminated with a small trigger patch.…

Split manufacturing (SM) and layout camouflaging (LC) are two promising techniques to obscure integrated circuits (ICs) from malicious entities during and after manufacturing. While both techniques enable protecting the intellectual…