Related papers: The Coarse Nash Bargaining Solutions
This paper presents a class of Dynamic Multi-Armed Bandit problems where the reward can be modeled as the noisy output of a time varying linear stochastic dynamic system that satisfies some boundedness constraints. The class allows many…
In this paper, we first propose a new parameterized definition of comparison matrix of a given complex matrix, which generalizes the definition proposed by \cite {Axe1}. Based on this, we propose a new class of complex nonsymmetric…
This article presents a general solution to the problem of computational complexity. First, it gives a historical introduction to the problem since the revival of the foundational problems of mathematics at the end of the 19th century.…
This paper deals with the compensation of nonlinearities in dynamical systems using nonlinear polynomial autoregressive models with exogenous inputs (NARX). The compensation approach is formulated for static and dynamical contexts, as well…
Argumentation is based on the exchange and valuation of interacting arguments, followed by the selection of the most acceptable of them (for example, in order to take a decision, to make a choice). Starting from the framework proposed by…
Causal models defined in terms of a collection of equations, as defined by Pearl, are axiomatized here. Axiomatizations are provided for three successively more general classes of causal models: (1) the class of recursive theories (those…
With recent advances in natural language processing, rationalization becomes an essential self-explaining diagram to disentangle the black box by selecting a subset of input texts to account for the major variation in prediction. Yet,…
This paper shows the affirmative answer to the local Nash problem for a toric singularity and analytically pretoric singularity. As a corollary we obtain the affirmative answer to the local Nash problem for a quasi-ordinary singularity.
Hedonic diversity games are a variant of the classical Hedonic games designed to better model a variety of questions concerning diversity and fairness. Previous works mainly targeted the case with two diversity classes (represented as…
We consider for the first time a stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium problem, i.e., with expected-value cost functions and joint feasibility constraints, under partial-decision information, meaning that the agents communicate only with…
Shapleys impossibility result indicates that the two-person bargaining problem has no non-trivial ordinal solution with the traditional game-theoretic bargaining model. Although the result is no longer true for bargaining problems with more…
Causal models defined in terms of a collection of equations, as defined by Pearl, are axiomatized here. Axiomatizations are provided for three successively more general classes of causal models: (1) the class of recursive theories (those…
The standard two-sided and one-sided matching problems, and the closely related school choice problem, have been widely studied from an axiomatic viewpoint. A small number of algorithms dominate the literature. For two-sided matching, the…
We introduce draft auctions, which is a sequential auction format where at each iteration players bid for the right to buy items at a fixed price. We show that draft auctions offer an exponential improvement in social welfare at equilibrium…
Most work in game theory assumes that players are perfect reasoners and have common knowledge of all significant aspects of the game. In earlier work, we proposed a framework for representing and analyzing games with possibly unaware…
We consider a class of Wasserstein distributionally robust Nash equilibrium problems, where agents construct heterogeneous data-driven Wasserstein ambiguity sets using private samples and radii, in line with their individual risk-averse…
This paper introduces a class of objects called decision rules that map infinite sequences of alternatives to a decision space. These objects can be used to model situations where a decision maker encounters alternatives in a sequence such…
The TRAP protocol solves rational agreement by combining accountable consensus with a one-shot BFTCR finalization phase. We present SNARE (Scalable Nash Agreement via Reward and Exclusion), the adaptation of TRAP to $n=5f{+}1$, and prove…
Moses & Nachum ([7]) identify conceptual flaws in Bacharach's generalization ([3]) of Aumann's seminal "agreeing to disagree" result ([1]). Essentially, Bacharach's framework requires agents' decision functions to be defined over events…
Negotiation is a very common interaction between automated agents. Many common negotiation protocols work with cardinal utilities, even though ordinal preferences, which only rank the outcomes, are easier to elicit from humans. In this work…