Related papers: The Coarse Nash Bargaining Solutions
Abstraction is key to scaling up reinforcement learning (RL). However, autonomously learning abstract state and action representations to enable transfer and generalization remains a challenging open problem. This paper presents a novel…
This paper tackles the problem of how two selfish users jointly determine the operating point in the achievable rate region of a two-user Gaussian interference channel through bargaining. In previous work, incentive conditions for two users…
This paper studies generalized Nash equilibrium problems that are given by rational functions. The optimization problems are not assumed to be convex. Rational expressions for Lagrange multipliers and feasible extensions of KKT points are…
The Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem refers to the question of the existence of a Nash equilibrium in an abstract economy. This model is due to Kenneth J. Arrow and Gerard Debreu in their pioneering work from 1954. An abstract economy…
We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies the following axioms: (i) strictly dominant actions are played with positive probability,…
Decarbonization of power systems plays a crucial role in achieving carbon neutral goals across the globe, but there exists a sharp contradiction between the emission reduction and levelized generation cost. Therefore, it is of great…
We give a simple proof of the well-known result that the marginal strategies of a coarse correlated equilibrium form a Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games. A corollary of this fact is that no-external-regret learning algorithms…
We introduce a new unified framework for modelling both decision problems and finite games based on quantifiers and selection functions. We show that the canonical utility maximisation is one special case of a quantifier and that our more…
The optimization of power systems involves complex uncertainties, such as technological progress, political context, geopolitical constraints. Negotiations at COP21 are complicated by the huge number of scenarios that various people want to…
This paper deals with an extension of the concept of correlated strategies to Markov stopping games. The Nash equilibrium approach to solving nonzero-sum stopping games may give multiple solutions. An arbitrator can suggest to each player…
Finding, counting, or determining the existence of Nash equilibria, where players must play optimally given each others' actions, are known to be computational intractable problems. We ask whether weakening optimality to the requirement…
School choice is the two-sided matching market where students (on one side) are to be matched with schools (on the other side) based on their mutual preferences. The classical algorithm to solve this problem is the celebrated deferred…
At the beginning of a dynamic game, players may have exogenous theories about how the opponents are going to play. Suppose that these theories are commonly known. Then, players will refine their first-order beliefs, and challenge their own…
We consider a model where an agent is must choose between alternatives that each provide only an imprecise description of the world (e.g. linguistic expressions). The set of alternatives is closed under logical conjunction and disjunction,…
In a context where a decision has to be taken collectively by several agents, the social choice problem consists in deciding whether there exists a socially acceptable rule that aggregates the individual preferences of the agents into a…
We propose and develop an algebraic approach to revealed preference. Our approach dispenses with non algebraic structure, such as topological assumptions. We provide algebraic axioms of revealed preference that subsume previous, classical…
We study the computational complexity of Nash equilibria in concurrent games with limit-average objectives. In particular, we prove that the existence of a Nash equilibrium in randomised strategies is undecidable, while the existence of a…
Coreference resolution is a key problem in natural language understanding that still escapes reliable solutions. One fundamental difficulty has been that of resolving instances involving pronouns since they often require deep language…
This paper considers dyadic-exchange networks in which individual agents autonomously form coalitions of size two and agree on how to split a transferable utility. Valid results for this game include stable (if agents have no unilateral…
We propose a stochastic first-order algorithm to learn the rationality parameters of simultaneous and non-cooperative potential games, i.e., the parameters of the agents' optimization problems. Our technique combines (i.) an active-set step…