Related papers: Rawlsian many-to-one matching with non-linear util…
In the {\sc Course Allocation} problem, there are a set of students and a set of courses at a given university. University courses may have different numbers of credits, typically related to different numbers of learning hours, and there…
We study two-sided many-to-one matching problems under a novel type of distributional constraints, resource-regional caps. In the context of college admissions, under resource-regional caps, an admitted student may be provided with a unit…
The many-to-one stable matching problem provides the fundamental abstraction of several real-world matching markets such as school choice and hospital-resident allocation. The agents on both sides are often referred to as residents and…
We highlight the tension between stability and equality in non transferable utility matching. We consider many to one matchings and refer to the two sides of the market as students and schools. The latter have aligned preferences, which in…
In this paper, we demonstrate that in many NP-complete variants of the stable matching problem, such as the Stable Hypergraph Matching problem, the Stable Multicommodity Flow problem, and the College Admission problem with common quotas, a…
Fairness in decision-making processes is often quantified using probabilistic metrics. However, these metrics may not fully capture the real-world consequences of unfairness. In this article, we adopt a utility-based approach to more…
We consider the problem of assigning students to schools, when students have different utilities for schools and schools have capacity. There are additional group fairness considerations over students that can be captured either by concave…
We study a many-to-one matching model inspired by school choice, where schools evaluate applicants using multiple rankings rather than a single priority order. We model each school's evaluation with social choice criteria to reflect the…
Stable matching theory is the foundation of centralized clearinghouses worldwide, from school choice programs to medical residency allocations. However, incorporating complex distributional goals-such as multi-dimensional diversity quotas…
We study many-to-one matching problems between institutions and individuals, where each institution may be matched to multiple individuals. The matching market includes couples, who view pairs of institutions as complementary. Institutions'…
We consider many-to-one matching problems, where one side consists of students and the other side of schools with capacity constraints. We study how to optimally increase the capacities of the schools so as to obtain a stable and perfect…
The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem of matching men to women so that no man and woman, who are not married to each other, both prefer each other. Such a problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from…
The school choice problem concerns the design and implementation of matching mechanisms that produce school assignments for students within a given public school district. Previously considered criteria for evaluating proposed mechanisms…
Using school choice as a motivating example, we introduce a stylized model of a many-to-one matching market where the clearinghouse aims to implement contingent priorities, i.e., priorities that depend on the current assignment, to…
We introduce and study a multi-class online resource allocation problem with group fairness guarantees. The problem involves allocating a fixed amount of resources to a sequence of agents, each belonging to a specific group. The primary…
We introduce the {\sc classified stable matching} problem, a problem motivated by academic hiring. Suppose that a number of institutes are hiring faculty members from a pool of applicants. Both institutes and applicants have preferences…
Group-fairness in classification aims for equality of a predictive utility across different sensitive sub-populations, e.g., race or gender. Equality or near-equality constraints in group-fairness often worsen not only the aggregate utility…
Many-to-one matching markets exist in numerous different forms, such as college admissions, matching medical interns to hospitals for residencies, assigning housing to college students, and the classic firms and workers market. In all these…
Massive surges of enrollments in courses have led to a crisis in several computer science departments - not only is the demand for certain courses extremely high from majors, but the demand from non-majors is also very high. Much of the…
In this study, we consider the real-world problem of assigning students to classes, where each student has a preference list, ranking a subset of classes in order of preference. Though we use existing approaches to include the daily class…