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We analyze cooperative Cournot games with boundedly rational firms. Due to cogni- tive constraints, the members of a coalition cannot accurately predict the coalitional structure of the non-members. Thus, they compute their value using…
We introduce the class of pay or play games, which captures scenarios in which each decision maker is faced with a choice between two actions: one with a fixed payoff and an- other with a payoff dependent on others' selected actions. This…
Despite many distributed resource allocation (DRA) algorithms have been reported in literature, it is still unknown how to allocate the resource optimally over multiple interacting coalitions. One major challenge in solving such a problem…
This paper seeks to establish a framework for directing a society of simple, specialized, self-interested agents to solve what traditionally are posed as monolithic single-agent sequential decision problems. What makes it challenging to use…
We introduce the concept of budget games. Players choose a set of tasks and each task has a certain demand on every resource in the game. Each resource has a budget. If the budget is not enough to satisfy the sum of all demands, it has to…
Online game playing algorithms produce high-quality strategies with a fraction of memory and computation required by their offline alternatives. Continual Resolving (CR) is a recent theoretically sound approach to online game playing that…
Game comonads offer a categorical view of a number of model-comparison games central to model theory, such as pebble and Ehrenfeucht-Fra\"iss\'e games. Remarkably, the categories of coalgebras for these comonads capture preservation of…
Modeling strategic conflict from a game theoretical perspective involves dealing with epistemic uncertainty. Payoff uncertainty models are typically restricted to simple probability models due to computational restrictions. Recent…
Bilateral bargaining under incomplete information provides a controlled testbed for evaluating large language model (LLM) agent capabilities. Bilateral trade demands individual rationality, strategic surplus maximization, and cooperation to…
The Prisoner's Dilemma, zero-sum games, LQR team problems, and differential games have shaped game theory in controls for decades, but the field's most pressing adversarial challenges demand a richer framework, and its name is Colonel…
We study rational agents with different perception capabilities in strategic games. We focus on a class of one-shot limited-perception games. These games extend simultaneous-move normal-form games by presenting each player with an…
In the literature on game-theoretic equilibrium finding, focus has mainly been on solving a single game in isolation. In practice, however, strategic interactions -- ranging from routing problems to online advertising auctions -- evolve…
We consider a class of deterministic mean field games, where the state associated with each player evolves according to an ODE which is linear w.r.t. the control. Existence, uniqueness, and stability of solutions are studied from the point…
We define a class of zero-sum games with combinatorial structure, where the best response problem of one player is to maximize a submodular function. For example, this class includes security games played on networks, as well as the problem…
In this paper, we study the strategic allocation of limited resources using a Colonel Blotto game (CBG) under a dynamic setting and analyze the problem using an online learning approach. In this model, one of the players is a learner who…
In dynamic noncooperative games, each player makes conjectures about other players' reactions before choosing a strategy. However, resulting equilibria may be multiple and do not always lead to desirable outcomes. These issues are typically…
In common-interest stochastic games all players receive an identical payoff. Players participating in such games must learn to coordinate with each other in order to receive the highest-possible value. A number of reinforcement learning…
We consider a repeated sequential game between a learner, who plays first, and an opponent who responds to the chosen action. We seek to design strategies for the learner to successfully interact with the opponent. While most previous…
An active line of research has considered games played on networks in which payoffs depend on both a player's individual decision and also the decisions of her neighbors. Such games have been used to model issues including the formation of…
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) is the leading framework for solving large imperfect-information games. It converges to an equilibrium by iteratively traversing the game tree. In order to deal with extremely large games,…