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In this paper I present several algorithmic techniques for improving the decision process of multiple types of agents behaving in environments where their interests are in conflict. The interactions between the agents are modelled by using…
This work addresses competitive resource allocation in a sequential setting, where two players allocate resources across objects or locations of shared interest. Departing from the simultaneous Colonel Blotto game, our framework introduces…
Colonel Blotto games with discrete strategy spaces effectively illustrate the intricate nature of multidimensional strategic reasoning. This paper studies the equilibrium set of such games where, in line with prior experimental work, the…
Algorithmic game theory (AGT) focuses on the design and analysis of algorithms for interacting agents, with interactions rigorously formalized within the framework of games. Results from AGT find applications in domains such as online…
The Colonel Blotto game, introduced by Borel in the 1920s, is often used for modeling various real-life settings, such as elections, lobbying, etc. The game is based on the allocation of limited resources by players to a set of fields. Each…
We develop value iteration-based algorithms to solve in a unified manner different classes of combinatorial zero-sum games with mean-payoff type rewards. These algorithms rely on an oracle, evaluating the dynamic programming operator up to…
Sequential reasoning is a complex human ability, with extensive previous research focusing on gaming AI in a single continuous game, round-based decision makings extending to a sequence of games remain less explored. Counter-Strike: Global…
Concurrent multi-player mean-payoff games are important models for systems of agents with individual, non-dichotomous preferences. Whilst these games have been extensively studied in terms of their equilibria in non-cooperative settings,…
We introduce one-way games, a framework motivated by applications in large-scale power restoration, humanitarian logistics, and integrated supply-chains. The distinguishable feature of the games is that the payoff of some player is…
Zero-determinant strategies are memory-one strategies in repeated games which unilaterally enforce linear relations between expected payoffs of players. Recently, the concept of zero-determinant strategies was extended to the class of…
In this note, we consider repeated play of a finite game using learning rules whose period-by-period behavior probabilities or empirical distributions converge to some notion of equilibria of the stage game. Our primary focus is on…
Regret minimization has proved to be a versatile tool for tree-form sequential decision making and extensive-form games. In large two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games, modern extensions of counterfactual regret minimization (CFR)…
This paper studies repeated games where two players play multiple duopolistic games simultaneously (multimarket contact). A key assumption is that each player receives a noisy and private signal about the other's actions (private monitoring…
In today's dynamic and interconnected world, resource constraints pose significant challenges across various domains, ranging from networks, logistics and manufacturing to project management and optimization, etc. Resource-constrained…
The Kelly or proportional allocation mechanism is a simple and efficient auction-based scheme that distributes an infinitely divisible resource proportionally to the agents bids. When agents are aware of the allocation rule, their…
We study a class of location games where players want to attract as many resources as possible and pay a cost when deviating from an exogenous reference location. This class of games includes political competitions between policy-interested…
We investigate a repeated two-player zero-sum game setting where the column player is also a designer of the system, and has full control on the design of the payoff matrix. In addition, the row player uses a no-regret algorithm to…
Betting games provide a natural setting to capture how information yields strategic advantage. The Kelly criterion for betting, long a cornerstone of portfolio theory and information theory, admits an interpretation in the limit of…
In this paper, we present a family of a control-stopping games which arise naturally in equilibrium-based models of market microstructure, as well as in other models with strategic buyers and sellers. A distinctive feature of this family of…
Assignment games represent a tractable yet versatile model of two-sided markets with transfers. We study the likely properties of the core of randomly generated assignment games. If the joint productivities of every firm and worker are…