Related papers: Entry Deterrence with Partial Reputation Spillover…

This work presents an asset pricing model that under rational expectation equilibrium perspective shows how, depending on risk aversion and noise volatility, a risky-asset has one equilibrium price that differs in term of efficiency: an…

Uni-directional social interactions are ubiquitous in real social networks whereas undirected interactions are intensively studied. We establish a voter model in a dynamical directed network. We analytically obtain the degree distribution…

We present an exploration of a reputation system based on explicit ratings weighted by the values of corresponding financial transactions from the perspective of its ability to grant "security" to market participants by protecting them from…

Internet tracking technologies and wearable electronics provide a vast amount of data to machine learning algorithms. This stock of data stands to increase with the developments of the internet of things and cyber-physical systems. Clearly,…

Platform giants in China have operated with persistently compressed margins in highly concentrated markets for much of the past decade, despite market shares exceeding 60\% in core segments. Standard theory predicts otherwise: either the…

A simple model of corruption that takes into account the effect of the interaction of a large number of agents by both rational decision making and myopic behavior is developed. Its stationary version turns out to be a rare example of an…

Reputation is a powerful mechanism to enforce cooperation among unrelated individuals through indirect reciprocity, but it suffers from disagreement originating from private assessment, noise, and incomplete information. In this work, we…

We develop a hierarchical Bayesian dynamic game for competitive inventory and pricing under incomplete information. Two firms repeatedly choose order quantities and prices while facing two layers of uncertainty: unknown market demand and…

In this paper we extend the framework of evolutionary inspection game put forward recently by the author and coworkers to a large class of conflict interactions dealing with the pressure executed by the major player (or principal) on the…

We propose a two-layer stochastic game model to study reinsurance contracting and competition in a market with one insurer and two competing reinsurers. The insurer negotiates with both reinsurers simultaneously for proportional reinsurance…

In this work we study a modified version of the two-dimensional Sznajd sociophysics model. In particular, we consider the effects of agents' reputations in the persuasion rules. In other words, a high-reputation group with a common opinion…

We model an informed agent with information about the future value of an asset trying to maximize profits when subjected to a transaction cost as well as a market maker tasked with setting fair transaction prices. In a single auction model,…

We present a model describing the competition between information transmission and decision making in financial markets. The solution of this simple model is recalled, and possible variations discussed. It is shown numerically that despite…

In real-world social systems, individual interactions are frequently shaped by reputation, which not only influences partner selection but also affects the nature and benefits of the interactions themselves. We propose a heterogeneous game…

Attempts at predatory capture may provoke a defensive response that reduces the very value of the predated resource. We provide a game-theoretic analysis of simultaneous-move, two-player Attacker-Defender games that model such interactions.…

Certain invasive plants may rely on interference mechanisms (allelopathy, e.g.) to gain competitive superiority over native species. But expending resources on interference presumably exacts a cost in another life-history trait, so that the…

The voter model on networks is crucial to understand opinion formation. Uni-directional social interactions are ubiquitous in real social networks whereas undirected interactions are intensively studied. We establish a voter model on a…

In auction and matching markets, estimating the welfare effects of demand-side treatments is challenging because of spillovers through the mechanism. We develop a quasi-experimental approach that avoids parametric assumptions typically…

Coordination games admit two types of equilibria: pure equilibria, where all players successfully coordinate their actions, and mixed equilibria, where players frequently experience miscoordination. The existing literature shows that under…

Partial order reductions have been successfully applied to model checking of concurrent systems and practical applications of the technique show nontrivial reduction in the size of the explored state space. We present a theory of partial…