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We consider a network of interacting agents and we model the process of choice on the adoption of a given innovative product by means of statistical-mechanics tools. The modelization allows us to focus on the effects of direct interactions…
Pricing algorithms have demonstrated the capability to learn tacit collusion that is largely unaddressed by current regulations. Their increasing use in markets, including oligopolistic industries with a history of collusion, calls for…
Using a rolling windows analysis of filtered and aligned stock index returns from 40 countries during the period 2006-2014, we construct Granger causality networks and investigate the ensuing structure of the relationships by studying…
I study sequential contests where the efforts of earlier players may be disclosed to later players by nature or by design. The model has a range of applications, including rent seeking, R&D, oligopoly, public goods provision, and tragedy of…
Active particles are entities that sustain persistent out-of-equilibrium motion by consuming energy. Under certain conditions, they exhibit the tendency to self-organize through coordinated movements, such as swarming via aggregation. While…
We achieve two primary goals in this work. First, we propose a flexible algorithm that can simulate various scenarios of state/government intervention. Secondly, we analyze the scenario exhibiting the critical behavior of the market of…
According to the evolutionary game theory principle, a strategy representing a higher payoff can spread among competitors. But there are cases when a player consistently overestimates or underestimates her own payoff, which undermines…
This paper studies a duopoly investment model with uncertainty. There are two alternative irreversible investments. The first firm to invest gets a monopoly benefit for a specified period of time. The second firm to invest gets information…
Rock-scissors-paper game, as the simplest model of intransitive relation between competing agents, is a frequently quoted model to explain the stable diversity of competitors in the race of surviving. When increasing the number of…
Leakage of data from publicly available Machine Learning (ML) models is an area of growing significance as commercial and government applications of ML can draw on multiple sources of data, potentially including users' and clients'…
We study shared sequencing for different chains from an economic angle. We introduce a minimal non-trivial model that captures cross-domain arbitrageurs' behavior and compare the performance of shared sequencing to that of separate…
This paper studies the equilibrium pricing of asset shares in the presence of dynamic private information. The market consists of a risk-neutral informed agent who observes the firm value, noise traders, and competitive market makers who…
The possible control of competitive invasion by infection of the invader and multiplicative noise is studied. The basic model is the Lotka-Volterra competition system with emergent carrying capacities. Several stationary solutions of the…
The proliferation of Social Network Sites (SNSs) has greatly reformed the way of information dissemination, but also provided a new venue for hosts with impure motivations to disseminate malicious information. Social trust is the basis for…
Reputation plays a major role in human societies, and it has been proposed as an explanation for the evolution of cooperation. While the majority of previous studies equates reputation with a transparent and complete history of players'…
We study expert advice under reputational incentives, with sell-side equity research as the lead application. A long-lived analyst receives a continuous private signal about a binary payoff and recommends a risky (Buy) or safe action.…
Outcome-only evaluation can certify economically unsafe agents: a policy can hit a business KPI while violating deployable behavioral discipline. In hotel pricing with hidden competitor state, a learner can achieve plausible revenue per…
We study Bayesian coordination games where agents receive noisy private information over the game's payoffs, and over each others' actions. If private information over actions is of low quality, equilibrium uniqueness obtains in a manner…
We consider thin incomplete financial markets, where traders with heterogeneous preferences and risk exposures have motive to behave strategically regarding the demand schedules they submit, thereby impacting prices and allocations. We…
This paper studies a system security problem in the context of observability based on a two-person noncooperative infinitely repeated game. Both the attacker and the defender have means to modify the dimension of the unobservable subspace,…