Related papers: Sequential Solution Concepts in Cooperative Games …
In cooperative games with transferable utilities, the Shapley value is an extreme case of marginalism while the Equal Division rule is an extreme case of egalitarianism. The Shapley value does not assign anything to the non-productive…
The Shapley value---probably the most important normative payoff division scheme in coalitional games---has recently been advocated as a useful measure of centrality in networks. However, although this approach has a variety of real-world…
We study the design of optimal incentives in sequential processes. To do so, we consider a basic and fundamental model in which an agent initiates a value-creating sequential process through costly investment with random success. If…
Purpose: We propose a model to present a possible mechanism for obtaining sizeable behavioural structures by simulating an agent based on the evolutionary public good game with available social learning. Methods: The model considered a…
In rational verification, the aim is to verify which temporal logic properties will obtain in a multi-agent system, under the assumption that agents ("players") in the system choose strategies for acting that form a game theoretic…
Today's multiagent systems have grown too complex to rely on centralized controllers, prompting increasing interest in the design of distributed algorithms. In this respect, game theory has emerged as a valuable tool to complement more…
A large branch of explainable machine learning is grounded in cooperative game theory. However, research indicates that game-theoretic explanations may mislead or be hard to interpret. We argue that often there is a critical mismatch…
We study the cost sharing problem for cooperative games in situations where the cost function $C$ is not available via oracle queries, but must instead be derived from data, represented as tuples $(S, C(S))$, for different subsets $S$ of…
Measuring individual productivity (or equivalently distributing the overall productivity) in a network structure of workers displaying peer effects has been a subject of ongoing interest in many areas ranging from academia to industry. In…
In the context of multi-player, general-sum games, there is an increasing interest in solution concepts modeling some form of communication among players, since they can lead to socially better outcomes with respect to Nash equilibria, and…
Consider a setting where selfish agents are to be assigned to coalitions or projects from a fixed set P. Each project k is characterized by a valuation function; v_k(S) is the value generated by a set S of agents working on project k. We…
Stochastic games with discounted payoff, introduced by Shapley, model adversarial interactions in stochastic environments where two players try to optimize a discounted sum of rewards. In this model, long-term weights are geometrically…
Shapley value is a classic notion from game theory, historically used to quantify the contributions of individuals within groups, and more recently applied to assign values to data points when training machine learning models. Despite its…
The attribution problem, that is the problem of attributing a model's prediction to its base features, is well-studied. We extend the notion of attribution to also apply to feature interactions. The Shapley value is a commonly used method…
A simple model for cooperation between "selfish" agents, which play an extended version of the Prisoner's Dilemma(PD) game, in which they use arbitrary payoffs, is presented and studied. A continuous variable, representing the probability…
Shapley value is a concept in cooperative game theory for measuring the contribution of each participant, which was named in honor of Lloyd Shapley. Shapley value has been recently applied in data marketplaces for compensation allocation…
We show that any cooperative game can be represented by an assignment of costly facilities to players, in which it is intuitively obvious how to allocate the total cost in an equitable manner. This equitable solution turns out to be the…
The Shapley value is a common tool in game theory to evaluate the importance of a player in a cooperative setting. In a geometric context, it provides a way to measure the contribution of a geometric object in a set towards some function on…
We study a game-theoretic model for pool formation in Proof of Stake blockchain protocols. In such systems, stakeholders can form pools as a means of obtaining regular rewards from participation in ledger maintenance, with the power of each…
In explainable machine learning, local post-hoc explanation algorithms and inherently interpretable models are often seen as competing approaches. This work offers a partial reconciliation between the two by establishing a correspondence…