Related papers: Sequential Solution Concepts in Cooperative Games …
We introduce a new allocation rule, the uniform-dividend value (UD-value), for cooperative games whose characteristic function is incomplete. The UD-value assigns payoffs by distributing the total surplus of each family of indistinguishable…
Cooperative interval game is a cooperative game in which every coalition gets assigned some closed real interval. This models uncertainty about how much the members of a coalition get for cooperating together. In this paper we study…
Cooperative games provide a framework to study cooperation among self-interested agents. They offer a number of solution concepts describing how the outcome of the cooperation should be shared among the players. Unfortunately, computational…
Collaborative machine learning enables multiple data owners to jointly train models for improved predictive performance. However, ensuring incentive compatibility and fair contribution-based rewards remains a critical challenge. Prior work…
The Shapley value, which is arguably the most popular approach for assigning a meaningful contribution value to players in a cooperative game, has recently been used intensively in explainable artificial intelligence. Its meaningfulness is…
This work focuses on developing efficient post-hoc explanations for quantum AI algorithms. In classical contexts, the cooperative game theory concept of the Shapley value adapts naturally to post-hoc explanations, where it can be used to…
As data emerges as a vital driver of technological and economic advancements, a key challenge is accurately quantifying its value in algorithmic decision-making. The Shapley value, a well-established concept from cooperative game theory,…
We study a class of probabilistic cooperative games which can be treated as an extension of the classical cooperative games with transferable utilities. The coalitions have an exogenous probability of being realized. This probability…
Motivated by the markets operating on fast time scales, we present a framework for online coalitional games with time-varying coalitional values and propose real-time payoff distribution mechanisms. Specifically, we design two online…
The classic paper of Shapley and Shubik \cite{Shapley1971assignment} characterized the core of the assignment game using ideas from matching theory and LP-duality theory and their highly non-trivial interplay. Whereas the core of this game…
We propose and evaluate a number of solutions to the problem of calculating the cost to serve each location in a single-vehicle transport setting. Such cost to serve analysis has application both strategically and operationally in…
In networked communications nodes choose among available actions and benefit from exchanging information through edges, while continuous technological progress fosters system functionings that increasingly often rely on cooperation. Growing…
We deal with coalitional games possessing strictly positive values. Individually rational allocations of such a game has clear fractional interpretations. Many concepts, including the long-existing core and other stability notions more…
Following the work of Lloyd Shapley on the Shapley value, and tangentially the work of Guillermo Owen, we offer an alternative non-probabilistic formulation of part of the work of Robert J. Weber in his 1978 paper "Probabilistic values for…
In this paper, we address the problem of fair sharing of the total value of a crowd-sourced network system between major participants (founders) and minor participants (crowd) using cooperative game theory. Shapley allocation is regarded as…
Over the last few years, the Shapley value, a solution concept from cooperative game theory, has found numerous applications in machine learning. In this paper, we first discuss fundamental concepts of cooperative game theory and axiomatic…
In networking and computing, resource allocation is typically addressed using classical sharing protocols as, for instance, the proportional division rule, the max-min fair allocation , or other solutions inspired by cooperative game…
The Shapley value has become popular in the Explainable AI (XAI) literature, thanks, to a large extent, to a solid theoretical foundation, including four "favourable and fair" axioms for attribution in transferable utility games. The…
We introduce a class of cooperative games induced by weighted directed graphs. Specifically, the coalitional value combines an internal interaction term given by the induced subgraph game with an external component based on minimal incoming…
Potential games, originally introduced in the early 1990's by Lloyd Shapley, the 2012 Nobel Laureate in Economics, and his colleague Dov Monderer, are a very important class of models in game theory. They have special properties such as the…