Related papers: Three-state coevolutionary game dynamics with envi…
In the framework of the paradigmatic prisoner's dilemma, we investigate the evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas in the presence of "cooperation facilitators". In our model, cooperators and defectors interact as in the classical…
We study the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game, whereby a coevolutionary rule is introduced that molds the random topology of the interaction network in two ways. First, existing links are deleted whenever a player…
We study environments in which agents are randomly matched to play a Prisoner's Dilemma, and each player observes a few of the partner's past actions against previous opponents. We depart from the existing related literature by allowing a…
How cooperation emerges in human societies is still a puzzle. Evolutionary game theory has been the standard framework to address this issue. In most models, every individual plays with all others, and then reproduce and die according to…
Recently, an evolutionary game dynamics model taking into account the environmental feedback has been proposed to describe the co-evolution of strategic actions of a population of individuals and the state of the surrounding environment;…
Cooperation underlies many natural and artificial systems. While voluntary participation can sustain cooperation without informational assumptions, real interactions are rarely anonymous, leaving the joint effects of participation and…
This paper presents research comparing the effects of different environments on the outcome of an extended Prisoner's Dilemma, in which agents have the option to abstain from playing the game. We consider three different pure strategies:…
We propose a model of emergence of cooperation in evolutionary games that high- lights the role of network formation and effect of network structure. In line with empirical data, the model proposes a mechanism that explains the persistence…
A simplified prisoner's game is studied on a square lattice when the players interacting with their neighbors can follow only two strategies: to cooperate (C) or to defect (D) unconditionally. The players updated in a random sequence have a…
We study the evolutionary robustness of strategies in infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games in which players make mistakes with a small probability and are patient. The evolutionary process we consider is given by the replicator…
Cooperative behavior lies at the very basis of human societies, yet its evolutionary origin remains a key unsolved puzzle. Whereas reciprocity or conditional cooperation is one of the most prominent mechanisms proposed to explain the…
The Optional Public Goods Game is a three-strategy game in which an individual can play as a cooperator or defector or decide not to participate. Despite its simplicity, this model can effectively represent many human social dilemmas, such…
We study the evolution of cooperation in structured populations within popular models of social dilemmas, whereby simple coevolutionary rules are introduced that may enhance players abilities to enforce their strategy on the opponent.…
Competition among cooperators, defectors, and loners is studied in an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with optional participation. Loners are risk averse i.e. unwilling to participate and rather rely on small but fixed earnings. This…
Motivated by the fact that the same social dilemma can be perceived differently by different players, we here study evolutionary multigames in structured populations. While the core game is the weak prisoner's dilemma, a fraction of the…
Heterogeneity has been studied as one of the most common explanations of the puzzle of cooperation in social dilemmas. A large number of papers have been published discussing the effects of increasing heterogeneity in structured populations…
Costly cooperation and costly signaling are both difficult to reconcile with simple fitness maximization, yet both are common in biological and social systems. We study a model in which agents emit costly signals and condition their actions…
We study the combined influence of selection and random fluctuations on the evolutionary dynamics of two-strategy ("cooperation" and "defection") games in populations comprising cooperation facilitators. The latter are individuals that…
People tend to align their use of language to the linguistic behaviour of their own ingroup and to simultaneously diverge from the language use of outgroups. This paper proposes to model this phenomenon of sociolinguistic identity…
We investigate the spatial distribution and the global frequency of agents who can either cooperate or defect. The agent interaction is described by a deterministic, non-iterated prisoner's dilemma game, further each agent only locally…