Related papers: Reach together: How populations win repeated games
Whether a population of decision-making individuals will reach a state of satisfactory decisions is a fundamental problem in studying collective behaviors. In the framework of evolutionary game theory and by means of potential functions,…
Richman games are zero-sum games, where in each turn players bid in order to determine who will play next [Lazarus et al.'99]. We extend the theory to impartial general-sum two player games called \emph{bidding games}, showing the existence…
We study the problem of finding Stackelberg equilibria in games with a massive number of players. So far, the only known game instances in which the problem is solved in polynomial time are some particular congestion games. However, a…
We present a causality-based algorithm for solving two-player reachability games represented by logical constraints. These games are a useful formalism to model a wide array of problems arising, e.g., in program synthesis. Our technique for…
In a polyomino set (1,2)-achievement game the maker and the breaker alternately mark one and two previously unmarked cells respectively. The maker's goal is to mark a set of cells congruent to one of a given set of polyominoes. The breaker…
In combinatorial game theory, the winning player for a position in normal play is analyzed and characterized via algebraic operations. Such analyses define a value for each position, called a game value. A game (ruleset) is called universal…
We study a sequential decision-making model where a set of items is repeatedly matched to the same set of agents over multiple rounds. The objective is to determine a sequence of matchings that either maximizes the utility of the least…
Probabilistic timed automata are a suitable formalism to model systems with real-time, nondeterministic and probabilistic behaviour. We study two-player zero-sum games on such automata where the objective of the game is specified as the…
A repeated game is an effective tool to model interactions and conflicts for players aiming to achieve their objectives in a long-term basis. Contrary to static noncooperative games that model an interaction among players in only one…
Purpose: We propose a model to present a possible mechanism for obtaining sizeable behavioural structures by simulating an agent based on the evolutionary public good game with available social learning. Methods: The model considered a…
2.5 player parity games combine the challenges posed by 2.5 player reachability games and the qualitative analysis of parity games. These two types of problems are best approached with different types of algorithms: strategy improvement…
This study employs gamified experiments to investigate and refine the Schelling Model of Segregation, a framework that demonstrates how individual preferences can lead to systemic segregation. Using a movement selection algorithm derived…
Repeated interactions are ubiquitous and known to promote social behaviour. While research often focuses on cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma, experimental evidence suggests repeated interactions also foster fairness. This study…
We consider a class of Nash games, termed as aggregative games, being played over a networked system. In an aggregative game, a player's objective is a function of the aggregate of all the players' decisions. Every player maintains an…
The winning condition of a parity game with costs requires an arbitrary, but fixed bound on the cost incurred between occurrences of odd colors and the next occurrence of a larger even one. Such games quantitatively extend parity games…
The accumulation of individual fitness or wealth is modelled as a population game in which pairs of individuals are recurrently and randomly matched to play a game over a resource. In addition, all individuals have random access to a…
We study games with finitely many participants, each having finitely many choices. We consider the following categories of participants: (I) populations: sets of nonatomic agents, (II) atomic splittable players, (III) atomic non splittable…
This paper introduces a hierarchical framework for population games, where individuals delegate decision-making to proxies that act within their own strategic interests. This framework extends classical population games, where individuals…
In communication systems where users share common resources, users' selfish behavior usually results in suboptimal resource utilization. There have been extensive works that model communication systems with selfish users as one-shot games…
This paper studies the equilibrium properties of the ``obvious strategy profile'' in large finite-player games. Each player in such a strategy profile simply adopts a randomized strategy as she would have used in a symmetric equilibrium of…