Related papers: Simple Communication
We study a dynamic sender-receiver game in which the sender observes a state evolving according to a Markov chain but does not observe the receiver's action. Despite the absence of feedback, dynamic interaction partially restores…
Large parts of professional human communication proceed in a request-reply fashion, whereby requests contain specifics of the information desired while replies can deliver the required information. However, time limitations often force…
We define a model of interactive communication where two agents with private types can exchange information before a game is played. The model contains Bayesian persuasion as a special case of a one-round communication protocol. We define…
We study the bounds of mediated communication in sender-receiver games in which the sender's payoff is state-independent. We show that the feasible distributions over the receiver's beliefs under mediation are those that induce zero…
We characterize the optimal reward functions (scoring rules) that incentivize an agent to acquire information and report it truthfully to the principal. The optimal scoring rules let the agent make a simple binary bet in single-dimensional…
Two long-lived senders play a dynamic game of competitive persuasion. Each period, each provides information to a single short-lived receiver. When the senders also set prices, we unearth a folk theorem: if they are sufficiently patient,…
In this work, we study the experts problem in the distributed setting where an expert's cost needs to be aggregated across multiple servers. Our study considers various communication models such as the message-passing model and the…
We study a dynamic game where an expert sends probabilistic forecasts to a decision-maker. The decision-maker verifies these forecasts using a calibration test based on past data. How should the expert send forecasts to maximize her payoff…
We consider a sender-receiver game with an outside option for the sender. After the cheap talk phase, the receiver makes a proposal to the sender, which the latter can reject. We study situations in which the sender's approval is crucial to…
When multiple informative equilibria are possible in a general cheap talk game, how much information can a principal guarantee herself? To answer this question, I define the notion of worst-case implementation-implementation via the worst…
Leveraging an established exercise in negotiation education, we build a novel dataset for studying how the use of language shapes bilateral bargaining. Our dataset extends existing work in two ways: 1) we recruit participants via behavioral…
We study the necessity of interaction between individuals for obtaining approximately efficient allocations. The role of interaction in markets has received significant attention in economic thinking, e.g. in Hayek's 1945 classic paper. We…
We introduce a model of estimation in the presence of strategic, self-interested sensors. We employ a game-theoretic setup to model the interaction between the sensors and the receiver. The cost function of the receiver is equal to the…
We study finite-state communication games in which the sender's preference is perturbed by random private idiosyncrasies. Persuasion is generically impossible within the class of statistically independent sender/receiver preferences --…
We consider the issue of multiple agents learning to communicate through reinforcement learning within partially observable environments, with a focus on information asymmetry in the second part of our work. We provide a review of the…
A fundamental result in mechanism design theory, the so-called revelation principle, asserts that for many questions concerning the existence of mechanisms with a given outcome one can restrict attention to truthful direct…
In an information aggregation game, a set of senders interact with a receiver through a mediator. Each sender observes the state of the world and communicates a message to the mediator, who recommends an action to the receiver based on the…
Explainability is a topic of growing importance in NLP. In this work, we provide a unified perspective of explainability as a communication problem between an explainer and a layperson about a classifier's decision. We use this framework to…
Cooperation through repetition is an important theme in game theory. In this regard, various celebrated ``folk theorems'' have been proposed for repeated games in increasingly more complex environments. There has, however, been insufficient…
I propose a cheap-talk model in which the sender can use private messages and only cares about persuading a subset of her audience. For example, a candidate only needs to persuade a majority of the electorate in order to win an election. I…