Related papers: Public Communication with Externalities

We study a Bayesian coordination game where agents receive private information on the game's payoff structure. In addition, agents receive private signals on each other's private information. We show that once agents possess these different…

In many decision-making scenarios, individuals strategically choose what information to disclose to optimize their own outcomes. It is unclear whether such strategic information disclosure can lead to good societal outcomes. To address this…

The tension between persuasion and privacy preservation is common in real-world settings. Online platforms should protect the privacy of web users whose data they collect, even as they seek to disclose information about these data to…

I study a model of information acquisition and transmission in which the sender's ability to misreport her findings is limited. The sender learns covertly, so a key observation is that in equilibrium she must be deterred from undetectably…

Besides the structure of interactions within networks, also the interactions between networks are of the outmost importance. We therefore study the outcome of the public goods game on two interdependent networks that are connected by means…

We study the impact of endogenous attention in a dynamic social media model. Each period, a user observes a random story and decides whether to share it. Users like sharing true and interesting stories, but identifying false stories…

This paper studies how the possibility of strategic misreporting shapes endogenous communication networks. Agents observe noisy private signals about a common state, form costly communication links, exchange private messages with their…

We study the dynamics of public opinion in a model in which agents change their opinions as a result of random binary encounters if the opinion difference is below their individual thresholds that evolve over time. We ground these…

Agents receive private signals about an unknown state. The resulting joint belief distributions are complex and lack a simple characterization. Our key insight is that, when conditioned on the state, the structure of belief distributions…

We study a Bayesian persuasion setting in which the receiver is trying to match the (binary) state of the world. The sender's utility is partially aligned with the receiver's, in that conditioned on the receiver's action, the sender derives…

Indirect reciprocity maintains cooperation in stranger societies by mapping individual behaviors onto reputation signals via social norms. Existing theoretical frameworks assume static environments with constant resources and fixed payoff…

In recent studies of political decision-making, apparently anomalous behavior has been observed on the part of voters, in which negative information about a candidate strengthens, rather than weakens, a prior positive opinion about the…

This paper studies a dynamic model of information acquisition, in which information might be secretly manipulated. A principal must choose between a safe action with known payoff and a risky action with uncertain payoff, favoring the safe…

Cooperation can be supported by indirect reciprocity via reputation.Thanks to gossip, reputations are built and circulated and humans can identify defectors and ostracise them. However, the evolutionary stability of gossip is allegedly…

We examine behavior in an experimental collaboration game that incorporates endogenous network formation. The environment is modeled as a generalization of the voluntary contributions mechanism. By varying the information structure in a…

The theoretical study of social learning typically assumes that each agent's action affects only her own payoff. In this paper, I present a model in which agents' actions directly affect the payoffs of other agents. On a discrete time line,…

Large parts of professional human communication proceed in a request-reply fashion, whereby requests contain specifics of the information desired while replies can deliver the required information. However, time limitations often force…

Recently, information transmission models motivated by the classical epidemic propagation, have been applied to a wide-range of social systems, generally assume that information mainly transmits among individuals via peer-to-peer…

We study emergent communication in a multi-agent reinforcement learning setting, where the agents solve cooperative tasks and have access to a communication channel. The communication channel may consist of either discrete symbols or…

Data buyers compete in a game of incomplete information about which a single data seller owns some payoff-relevant information. The seller faces a joint information- and mechanism-design problem: deciding which information to sell, while…