Related papers: Efficiently Computing Equilibria in Budget-Aggrega…

We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination. Towards this end, we consider coordination games where agents have different intrinsic…

The use of game theoretic methods for control in multiagent systems has been an important topic in recent research. Valid utility games in particular have been used to model real-world problems; such games have the convenient property that…

Game theory has emerged as a powerful framework for modeling a large range of multi-agent scenarios. Many algorithmic solutions require discrete, finite games with payoffs that have a closed-form specification. In contrast, many real-world…

Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…

Computing Nash equilibrium in multi-agent games is a longstanding challenge at the interface of game theory and computer science. It is well known that a general normal form game in N players and k strategies requires exponential space…

We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…

We describe a new complete algorithm for computing Nash equilibrium in multiplayer general-sum games, based on a quadratically-constrained feasibility program formulation. We demonstrate that the algorithm runs significantly faster than the…

This work proposes a novel set of techniques for approximating a Nash equilibrium in a finite, normal-form game. It achieves this by constructing a new reformulation as solving a parameterized system of multivariate polynomials with tunable…

We study the problem of computing an approximate Nash equilibrium of a game whose strategy space is continuous without access to gradients of the utility function. Such games arise, for example, when players' strategies are represented by…

We study combinatorial auctions where each item is sold separately but simultaneously via a second price auction. We ask whether it is possible to efficiently compute in this game a pure Nash equilibrium with social welfare close to the…

Recently Bramoulle and Kranton presented a model for the provision of public goods over a network and showed the existence of a class of Nash equilibria called specialized equilibria wherein some agents exert maximum effort while other…

We consider the framework of aggregative games, in which the cost function of each agent depends on his own strategy and on the average population strategy. As first contribution, we investigate the relations between the concepts of Nash…

We consider a class of dynamic collective choice models with social interactions, whereby a large number of non-uniform agents have to individually settle on one of multiple discrete alternative choices, with the relevance of their would-be…

Two-player complete-information game trees are perhaps the simplest possible setting for studying general-sum games and the computational problem of finding equilibria. These games admit a simple bottom-up algorithm for finding subgame…

Auctions are modeled as Bayesian games with continuous type and action spaces. Determining equilibria in auction games is computationally hard in general and no exact solution theory is known. We introduce an algorithmic framework in which…

Firms (businesses, service providers, entertainment organizations, political parties, etc.) advertise on social networks to draw people's attention and improve their awareness of the brands of the firms. In all such cases, the competitive…

We consider a model of priced resource sharing that combines both queueing behavior and strategic behavior. We study a priority service model where a single server allocates its capacity to agents in proportion to their payment to the…

We propose fully-distributed algorithms for Nash equilibrium seeking in aggregative games over networks. We first consider the case where local constraints are present and we design an algorithm combining, for each agent, (i) the projected…

In this paper we consider strategic cost sharing games with so-called arbitrary sharing based on various combinatorial optimization problems, such as vertex and set cover, facility location, and network design problems. We concentrate on…

We study the problem of computing an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium in repeated games. Earlier work by Borgs et al. [2010] suggests that this problem is intractable. We show that if we make a slight change to their model---modeling the players…