Related papers: On Zero-sum Game Representation for Replicator Dyn…
Evolutionary game theory combines game theory and dynamical systems and is customarily adopted to describe evolutionary dynamics in multi-agent systems. In particular, it has been proven to be a successful tool to describe multi-agent…
Originating in evolutionary game theory, the class of "zero-determinant" strategies enables a player to unilaterally enforce linear payoff relationships in simple repeated games. An upshot of this kind of payoff constraint is that it can…
In this paper we examine the relationship between the flow of the replicator dynamic, the continuum limit of Multiplicative Weights Update, and a game's response graph. We settle an open problem establishing that under the replicator, sink…
We study the convergence properties of a payoff-based higher-order version of replicator dynamics, a widely studied model in evolutionary dynamics and game-theoretic learning, in contractive games. Recent work has introduced a…
Continuous-time game dynamics are typically first order systems where payoffs determine the growth rate of the players' strategy shares. In this paper, we investigate what happens beyond first order by viewing payoffs as higher order forces…
Evolutionary dynamics provides an iconic relationship --- the periodic frequency of a game is determined by the payoff matrix of the game. This paper reports the first experimental evidence to demonstrate this relationship. Evidence comes…
Zero-determinant (ZD) strategies, a recently found novel class of strategies in repeated games, has attracted much attention in evolutionary game theory. A ZD strategy unilaterally enforces a linear relation between average payoffs of…
Coevolutionary game dynamics is the result of players that may change their strategies and their network of interaction. For such games, and based on interpreting strategies as configurations, strategy-to-payoff maps can be defined for…
The predominant paradigm in evolutionary game theory and more generally online learning in games is based on a clear distinction between a population of dynamic agents that interact given a fixed, static game. In this paper, we move away…
Evolutionary game theory studies populations that change in response to an underlying game. Often, the functional form relating outcome to player attributes or strategy is complex, preventing mathematical progress. In this work, we…
In a laboratory experiment, round by round, individual interactions should lead to the social evolutionary rotation in population strategy state space. Successive switching the incentive parameter should lead to successive change of the…
In this paper, we consider the replicator-mutator dynamics for pairwise social dilemmas where the payoff entries are random variables. The randomness is incorporated to take into account the uncertainty, which is inevitable in practical…
Evolutionary game dynamics is one of the most fruitful frameworks for studying evolution in different disciplines, from Biology to Economics. Within this context, the approach of choice for many researchers is the so-called replicator…
A replicator dynamic for non-exchangeable agents in a continuous action space is formulated and its well-posedness is proven in a space of probability measures. The non-exchangeability allows for the analysis of evolutionary games involving…
A new mathematical model for evolutionary games on graphs is proposed to extend the classical replicator equation to finite populations of players organized on a network with generic topology. Classical results from game theory,…
Evolution occurs in populations of reproducing individuals. Reproduction depends on the payoff a strategy receives. The payoff depends on the environment that may change over time, on intrinsic uncertainties, and on other sources of…
In this paper, we study the number of equilibria of the replicator-mutator dynamics for both deterministic and random multi-player two-strategy evolutionary games. For deterministic games, using Decartes' rule of signs, we provide a formula…
In this work we propose a kinetic formulation for evolutionary game theory for zero sum games when the agents use mixed strategies. We start with a simple adaptive rule, where after an encounter each agent increases the probability of play…
Iterated games are a fundamental component of economic and evolutionary game theory. They describe situations where two players interact repeatedly and have the possibility to use conditional strategies that depend on the outcome of…
Repeated games have provided an explanation how mutual cooperation can be achieved even if defection is more favorable in a one-shot game in prisoner's dilemma situation. Recently found zero-determinant strategies have substantially been…