Related papers: Ambiguous Persuasion with Prior Ambiguity

I prove that it is irrational for agents with even slightly private preferences to condition their strategy on private information that is payoff-irrelevant to them, contrary to powerful techniques for analyzing communication and repeated…

We demonstrate that the set of cost distributions under which the optimal strategy for maximizing compliance (or more generally, effort) in a binary choice environment is identical to the optimal strategy for maximizing the accuracy of the…

In many real-world scenarios, experts must convey complex information with limited message capacity. This paper explores how the availability of messages influences an expert's persuasive ability. We develop a geometric representation of…

We propose a model of causal persuasion, in which a sender selectively discloses a set of variables together with their true joint distribution and proposes a subjective causal model that binds them. A receiver is persuaded by this model…

We study the set of possible joint posterior belief distributions of a group of agents who share a common prior regarding a binary state, and who observe some information structure. For two agents we introduce a quantitative version of…

When users lack specific knowledge of various system parameters, their uncertainty may lead them to make undesirable deviations in their decision making. To alleviate this, an informed system operator may elect to signal information to…

We consider an infinite collection of agents who make decisions, sequentially, about an unknown underlying binary state of the world. Each agent, prior to making a decision, receives an independent private signal whose distribution depends…

In many biological networks the responses of individual elements are ambiguous. We consider a scenario in which many sensors respond to a shared signal, each with limited information capacity, and ask that the outputs together convey as…

In this paper, we introduce a mixed form of ambiguous and unambiguous quantum state discriminations, and show that the mixed form has higher success probability than the unambiguous quantum state discriminations.

We study games in which a leader makes a single commitment, and then multiple followers (each with a different utility function) respond. In particular, we study ambiguous commitment strategies in these games, in which the leader may commit…

We study experimentally contests in which players make investment decisions sequentially, and information on prior investments is revealed between stages. Using a between-subject design, we consider all possible sequences in contests of…

This work investigates a dynamic variant of Bayesian persuasion, in which a strategic sender seeks to influence a receiver's belief over time through controlling the timing of the information disclosure, under resource constraints. We…

This article introduces a framework for evaluating statistical decisions under both prior ambiguity and likelihood misspecification. We begin with an ambiguity set - a frequentist model that pairs a possibly misspecified likelihood with…

We define a model of interactive communication where two agents with private types can exchange information before a game is played. The model contains Bayesian persuasion as a special case of a one-round communication protocol. We define…

Ambiguity and ambiguity aversion have been widely studied in decision theory and economics both at a theoretical and an experimental level. After Ellsberg's seminal studies challenging subjective expected utility theory (SEUT), several…

We investigate a two-period Bayesian persuasion game, where the receiver faces a decision, akin to a one-armed bandit problem: to undertake an action, gaining noisy information and a corresponding positive or negative payoff, or to refrain.…

We examine receiver-optimal mechanisms for aggregating information divided across many biased senders. Each sender privately observes an unconditionally independent signal about an unknown state, so no sender can verify another's report. A…

We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where the persuader and the decision maker communicate through an imperfect channel that has a fixed and limited number of messages and is subject to exogenous noise. We provide an upper bound on…

We propose a new notion of credibility for Bayesian persuasion problems. A disclosure policy is credible if the sender cannot profit from tampering with her messages while keeping the message distribution unchanged. We show that the…

We consider general Bayesian persuasion problems where the receiver's utility is single-peaked in a one-dimensional action. We show that a signal that pools at most two states in each realization is always optimal, and that such pairwise…