Related papers: Last-Iterate Convergence in Adaptive Regret Minimi…
Function approximation is a powerful approach for structuring large decision problems that has facilitated great achievements in the areas of reinforcement learning and game playing. Regression counterfactual regret minimization (RCFR) is a…
We study online optimization methods for zero-sum games, a fundamental problem in adversarial learning in machine learning, economics, and many other domains. Traditional methods approximate Nash equilibria (NE) using either regret-based…
Learning and computation of equilibria are central problems in game theory, theory of computation, and artificial intelligence. In this work, we introduce proximal regret, a new notion of regret based on proximal operators that lies…
In this paper, we present exploitability descent, a new algorithm to compute approximate equilibria in two-player zero-sum extensive-form games with imperfect information, by direct policy optimization against worst-case opponents. We prove…
Pseudo-games are a natural and well-known generalization of normal-form games, in which the actions taken by each player affect not only the other players' payoffs, as in games, but also the other players' strategy sets. The solution…
Counterfactual Regret Minimization and variants (e.g. Public Chance Sampling CFR and Pure CFR) have been known as the best approaches for creating approximate Nash equilibrium solutions for imperfect information games such as poker. This…
In this paper, we examine the Nash equilibrium convergence properties of no-regret learning in general N-player games. For concreteness, we focus on the archetypal follow the regularized leader (FTRL) family of algorithms, and we consider…
Regret has been established as a foundational concept in online learning, and likewise has important applications in the analysis of learning dynamics in games. Regret quantifies the difference between a learner's performance against a…
While in two-player zero-sum games the Nash equilibrium is a well-established prescriptive notion of optimal play, its applicability as a prescriptive tool beyond that setting is limited. Consequently, the study of decentralized learning…
The literature on game-theoretic equilibrium finding predominantly focuses on single games or their repeated play. Nevertheless, numerous real-world scenarios feature playing a game sampled from a distribution of similar, but not identical…
Multi-team games, prevalent in robotics and resource management, involve team members striving for a joint best response against other teams. Team-Nash equilibrium (TNE) predicts the outcomes of such coordinated interactions. However, can…
This paper explores the use of Maximum Causal Entropy Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) within the context of discrete-time stationary Mean-Field Games (MFGs) characterized by finite state spaces and an infinite-horizon,…
The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their…
Online learning algorithms that minimize regret provide strong guarantees in situations that involve repeatedly making decisions in an uncertain environment, e.g. a driver deciding what route to drive to work every day. While regret…
We study online learning and equilibrium computation in games with polyhedral decision sets, a property shared by both normal-form games and extensive-form games (EFGs), when the learning agent is restricted to using a best-response oracle.…
We consider prediction with expert advice when data are generated from distributions varying arbitrarily within an unknown constraint set. This semi-adversarial setting includes (at the extremes) the classical i.i.d. setting, when the…
Contemporary applications of machine learning in two-team e-sports and the superior expressivity of multi-agent generative adversarial networks raise important and overlooked theoretical questions regarding optimization in two-team games.…
The combination of deep reinforcement learning and search at both training and test time is a powerful paradigm that has led to a number of successes in single-agent settings and perfect-information games, best exemplified by AlphaZero.…
Extensive-Form Game (EFG) represents a fundamental model for analyzing sequential interactions among multiple agents and the primary challenge to solve it lies in mitigating sample complexity. Existing research indicated that Double Oracle…
The competition between radar and jammer is one emerging issue in modern electronic warfare, which in principle can be viewed as a non-cooperative game with two players. In this work, the competition between a frequency agile (FA) radar and…