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Provably efficient and robust equilibrium computation in general-sum Markov games remains a core challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning. Nash equilibrium is computationally intractable in general and brittle due to equilibrium…

We study online learning in two-player uninformed Markov games, where the opponent's actions and policies are unobserved. In this setting, Tian et al. (2021) show that achieving no-external-regret is impossible without incurring an…

Although logit quantal response equilibrium (logit QRE) offers a natural equilibrium selection mechanism and converges to Nash equilibrium as the rationality parameter tends to infinity, its computation in extensive-form games is generally…

In this paper, we investigate the seeking of Nash equilibrium (NE) in a non-cooperative quadratic game where all agents exchange their delayed strategy information with their neighbors. To extend best-response algorithms to the delayed…

We study the robust Nash equilibrium (RNE) for a class of games in communications systems and networks where the impact of users on each other is an additive function of their strategies. Each user measures this impact, which may be…

Noncooperative game-theoretic tools have been increasingly used to study many important resource allocation problems in communications, networking, smart grids, and portfolio optimization. In this paper, we consider a general class of…

We study multi-player general-sum Markov games with one of the players designated as the leader and the other players regarded as followers. In particular, we focus on the class of games where the followers are myopic, i.e., they aim to…

This paper studies the last-iterate convergence properties of the exponential weights algorithm with constant learning rates. We consider a repeated interaction in discrete time, where each player uses an exponential weights algorithm…

A mean-field game (MFG) seeks the Nash Equilibrium of a game involving a continuum of players, where the Nash Equilibrium corresponds to a fixed point of the best-response mapping. However, simple fixed-point iterations do not always…

Policy Space Response Oracle methods (PSRO) provide a general solution to learn Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games but suffer from two drawbacks: (1) the computation inefficiency due to the need for consistent meta-game…

Multi-agent robust reinforcement learning, also known as multi-player robust Markov games (RMGs), is a crucial framework for modeling competitive interactions under environmental uncertainties, with wide applications in multi-agent systems.…

A long line of works characterizes the sample complexity of regret minimization in sequential decision-making by min-max programs. In the corresponding saddle-point game, the min-player optimizes the sampling distribution against an…

There has been substantial progress on finding game-theoretic equilibria. Most of that work has focused on games with finite, discrete action spaces. However, many games involving space, time, money, and other fine-grained quantities have…

By incorporating regret minimization, double oracle methods have demonstrated rapid convergence to Nash Equilibrium (NE) in normal-form games and extensive-form games, through algorithms such as online double oracle (ODO) and extensive-form…

We consider the problem of finding Nash equilibrium for two-player turn-based zero-sum games. Inspired by the AlphaGo Zero (AGZ) algorithm, we develop a Reinforcement Learning based approach. Specifically, we propose…

We address learning Nash equilibria in convex games under the payoff information setting. We consider the case in which the game pseudo-gradient is monotone but not necessarily strictly monotone. This relaxation of strict monotonicity…

We revisit the problem of online learning with sleeping experts/bandits: in each time step, only a subset of the actions are available for the algorithm to choose from (and learn about). The work of Kleinberg et al. (2010) showed that there…

Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) is the dominant algorithmic family for solving large imperfect-information games, underpinning breakthroughs such as Libratus and Pluribus in No-Limit Texas Hold'em poker. In real-time game-playing…

This paper mainly investigates a class of distributed Variational Generalized Nash Equilibrium (VGNE) seeking problems for both online noncooperative games and online aggregative games with time-varying coupling inequality constraints. Two…

Follow the regularized leader FTRL is the premier algorithm for online optimization. However, despite decades of research on its convergence in constrained optimization -- and potential games in particular -- its behavior remained hitherto…