Related papers: Strategy Method Effects in Centipede Games: An Opt…

Machine learning systems have been widely used to make decisions about individuals who may behave strategically to receive favorable outcomes, e.g., they may genuinely improve the true labels or manipulate observable features directly to…

We study stochastic evolution of optional games on simple graphs. There are two strategies, A and B, whose interaction is described by a general payoff matrix. In addition there are one or several possibilities to opt out from the game by…

Graph games played by two players over finite-state graphs are central in many problems in computer science. In particular, graph games with $\omega$-regular winning conditions, specified as parity objectives, which can express properties…

In dynamic noncooperative games, each player makes conjectures about other players' reactions before choosing a strategy. However, resulting equilibria may be multiple and do not always lead to desirable outcomes. These issues are typically…

Information uncertainty is one of the major challenges facing applications of game theory. In the context of Stackelberg games, various approaches have been proposed to deal with the leader's incomplete knowledge about the follower's…

The centipede game is a two-player non-zero-sum game. Each turn, a player can choose whether they want to take or pass a growing reward. The classical, rational solution of this game shows defection in the first round, when in reality,…

We investigate how distorted, yet structured, beliefs can persist in strategic situations. Specifically, we study two-player games in which each player is endowed with a biased-belief function that represents the discrepancy between a…

Deception is a technique to mislead human or computer systems by manipulating beliefs and information. Successful deception is characterized by the information-asymmetric, dynamic, and strategic behaviors of the deceiver and the deceivee.…

In this paper, we examine the long-run behavior of regularized, no-regret learning in finite games. A well-known result in the field states that the empirical frequencies of no-regret play converge to the game's set of coarse correlated…

Strategic uncertainty complicates policy design in coordination games. To rein in strategic uncertainty, the Planner in this paper connects the problem of policy design to that of equilibrium selection. We characterize the subsidy scheme…

We analyse the strategy equilibrium of dilemma games considering a payoff matrix affected by small and random perturbations on the off-diagonal. Notably, a recent work [1] reported that, while cooperation is sustained by perturbations…

We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…

In many settings of interest, a policy is set by one party, the leader, in order to influence the action of another party, the follower, where the follower's response is determined by some private information. A natural question to ask is,…

We consider the problem of designing a linear program that has diverse solutions as the right-hand side varies. This problem arises in video game settings where designers aim to have players use different "weapons" or "tactics" as they…

Studying strategy update rules in the framework of evolutionary game theory, one can differentiate between imitation processes and aspiration-driven dynamics. In the former case, individuals imitate the strategy of a more successful peer.…

The ability to inferring latent psychological traits from human behavior is key to developing personalized human-interacting machine learning systems. Approaches to infer such traits range from surveys to manually-constructed experiments…

Deep Reinforcement Learning combined with Fictitious Play shows impressive results on many benchmark games, most of which are, however, single-stage. In contrast, real-world decision making problems may consist of multiple stages, where the…

We introduce and study an evolutionary complementarity game where in each round a player of population 1 is paired with a member of population 2. The game is symmetric, and each player tries to obtain an advantageous deal, but when one of…

This paper presents a novel approach to analyze human decision-making that involves comparing the behavior of professional chess players relative to a computational benchmark of cognitively bounded rationality. This benchmark is constructed…

We show the existence and effective computability of optimal winning strategies for request-response games in case the quality of a play is measured by the limit superior of the mean accumulated waiting times between requests and their…