Related papers: Generating Satisfiable Benchmark Instances for Sta…
In this paper, we consider one-to-one matchings between two disjoint groups of agents. Each agent has a preference over a subset of the agents in the other group, and these preferences may contain ties. Strong stability is one of the…
We study a variation of the Stable Marriage problem, where every man and every woman express their preferences as preference lists which may be incomplete and contain ties. This problem is called the Stable Marriage problem with Ties and…
The stable roommates problem is a non-bipartite version of the stable matching problem in a bipartite graph. In this paper, we consider the stable roommates problem with ties. In particular, we focus on strong stability, which is one of the…
The stable matching problem is a prototype model in economics and social sciences where agents act selfishly to optimize their own satisfaction, subject to mutually conflicting constraints. A stable matching is a pairing of adjacent…
It is well known that every stable matching instance $I$ has a rotation poset $R(I)$ that can be computed efficiently and the downsets of $R(I)$ are in one-to-one correspondence with the stable matchings of $I$. Furthermore, for every poset…
In this work, we consider ranking problems among a finite set of candidates: for instance, selecting the top-$k$ items among a larger list of candidates or obtaining the full ranking of all items in the set. These problems are often…
In many applications, SMT solvers are utilized to solve similar or identical tasks over time. Significant variations in performance due to small changes in the input are not uncommon and lead to frustration for users. This sort of stability…
This paper addresses the Flexible Job Shop Scheduling Problem and its extension with Worker Flexibility, which integrates workforce assignment into machine-operation scheduling. Diverse solvers have been proposed across multiple…
Consider a setting where selfish agents are to be assigned to coalitions or projects from a fixed set P. Each project k is characterized by a valuation function; v_k(S) is the value generated by a set S of agents working on project k. We…
There are growing concerns that algorithms, which increasingly make or influence important decisions pertaining to individuals, might produce outcomes that discriminate against protected groups. We study such fairness concerns in the…
This paper focuses on two-sided matching where one side (a hospital or firm) is matched to the other side (a doctor or worker) so as to maximize a cardinal objective under general feasibility constraints. In a standard model, even though…
We consider a far generalization of the well-known stable roommates and non-bipartite stable allocation problems. In its setting, one is given a finite non-bipartite graph $G=(V,E)$ with nonnegative integer edge capacities $b(e)\in{\mathbb…
Despite the success of large-scale empirical risk minimization (ERM) at achieving high accuracy across a variety of machine learning tasks, fair ERM is hindered by the incompatibility of fairness constraints with stochastic optimization. We…
We study parameterized approximability of three optimization problems related to stable matching: (1) Min-BP-SMI: Given a stable marriage instance and a number k, find a size-at-least-k matching that minimizes the number $\beta$ of blocking…
We study the two-sided stable matching problem with one-sided uncertainty for two sets of agents A and B, with equal cardinality. Initially, the preference lists of the agents in A are given but the preferences of the agents in B are…
We study a variant of the Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students where ties are allowed in the preference lists of students and lecturers (SPA-ST). We investigate the concept of strong stability in this…
The study of stable matchings usually relies on the assumption that agents' preferences over the opposite side are complete and known. In many real markets, however, preferences might be uncertain and revealed only through costly…
In the Hospitals/Residents (HR) problem, agents are partitioned into hospitals and residents. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if…
The Stable Marriage problem (SM), solved by the famous deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (GS), has many natural generalizations. If we allow ties in preferences, then the problem of finding a maximum stable matching becomes…
Fair algorithm evaluation is conditioned on the existence of high-quality benchmark datasets that are non-redundant and are representative of typical optimization scenarios. In this paper, we evaluate three heuristics for selecting diverse…