Related papers: Power in Sharing Networks with a priori Unions

We investigate the manipulation of power indices in TU-cooperative games by stimulating (subject to a budget constraint) changes in the propensity of other players to participate to the game. We display several algorithms that show that the…

We consider a sharing economy network where agents embedded in a graph share their resources. This is a fundamental model that abstracts numerous emerging applications of collaborative consumption systems. The agents generate a random…

Measuring individual productivity (or equivalently distributing the overall productivity) in a network structure of workers displaying peer effects has been a subject of ongoing interest in many areas ranging from academia to industry. In…

We consider how selfish agents are likely to share revenues derived from maintaining connectivity between important network servers. We model a network where a failure of one node may disrupt communication between other nodes as a…

This study introduces the \emph{edge-based Shapley value}, a novel allocation rule within cooperative game theory, specifically tailored for networked systems, where value is generated through interactions represented by edges. Traditional…

We introduce a new network centrality measure founded on the Gately value for cooperative games with transferable utilities. A directed network is interpreted as representing control or authority relations between players--constituting a…

Inspired by socio-political scenarios, like dictatorships, in which a minority of people exercise control over a majority of weakly interconnected individuals, we propose vulnerability and power measures defined on groups of actors of…

In social network analysis, there is a common perception that influence is relevant to determine the global behavior of the society and thus it can be used to enforce cooperation by targeting an adequate initial set of individuals or to…

We extend the coopetition index introduced by Aleandri and Dall'Aglio (2025) for simple games to the broader class of monotone transferable utility (TU) games and to all non-empty coalitions, including singletons. The new formulation allows…

Exchange of services and resources in, or over, networks is attracting nowadays renewed interest. However, despite the broad applicability and the extensive study of such models, e.g., in the context of P2P networks, many fundamental…

In this paper, we consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) coalitional games where the coalitional values are unknown but vary within certain bounds. As a solution to the resulting family of games, we formalise the notion of "robust…

In networked communications nodes choose among available actions and benefit from exchanging information through edges, while continuous technological progress fosters system functionings that increasingly often rely on cooperation. Growing…

In this paper, we present a framework for studying the following fundamental question in network analysis: How should one assess the centralities of nodes in an information/influence propagation process over a social network? Our framework…

In a stock market, the price fluctuations are interactive, that is, one listed company can influence others. In this paper, we seek to study the influence relationships among listed companies by constructing a directed network on the basis…

We consider signed networks in which connections or edges can be either positive (friendship, trust, alliance) or negative (dislike, distrust, conflict). Early literature in graph theory theorized that such networks should display…

Purpose of our work is to obtain a basic understanding and comparison of the performance and structure of real Knowledge Networks, to identify strengths and weaknesses and to highlight guidelines for improvements. We selected 18 Knowledge…

This paper reviews the main network analysis methods used to measure structural power, which refers to the ability to shape outcomes through network position and influence, and the ability to affect others through network connections. These…

This paper introduces the Myerson interaction index (MII), an extension of the Shapley interaction index to cooperative games with communication structures restricted by graphs. We establish a formal framework for interaction indices on…

We introduce a class of cooperative games induced by weighted directed graphs. Specifically, the coalitional value combines an internal interaction term given by the induced subgraph game with an external component based on minimal incoming…

The ubiquity of social platforms has reshaped the way information, behaviors, and advertisements diffuse across networks, with influence propagation often initiated by a small set of ``seed'' users. While much of the literature emphasizes…