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This paper deals with a bilevel approach of the location-allocation problem with dimensional facilities. We present a general model that allows us to consider very general shapes of domains for the dimensional facilities and we prove the…
In a facility game one or more facilities are placed in a metric space to serve a set of selfish agents whose addresses are their private information. In a classical facility game, each agent wants to be as close to a facility as possible,…
We study the multistage $K$-facility reallocation problem on the real line, where we maintain $K$ facility locations over $T$ stages, based on the stage-dependent locations of $n$ agents. Each agent is connected to the nearest facility at…
We study the distributed facility location games with candidate locations, where agents on a line are partitioned into groups. Both desirable and obnoxious facility location settings are discussed. In distributed location problems,…
The metric capacitated facility location is a well-studied problem for which, while constant factor approximations are known, no efficient relaxation with constant integrality gap is known. The question whether there is such a relaxation is…
We revisit the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for allocating divisible items among two agents who have linear utilities, where payments are disallowed and there is no prior information on the agents' preferences. The…
We study a non-cooperative two-sided facility location game in which facilities and clients behave strategically. This is in contrast to many other facility location games in which clients simply visit their closest facility. Facility…
In this paper, we study the Facility Location Problem with Scarce Resources (FLPSR) under the assumption that agents' type follow a probability distribution. In the FLPSR, the objective is to identify the optimal locations for one or more…
This article describes a model and an exact solution method for facility location problems with decision-dependent uncertainties. The model allows characterizing the probability distribution of the random elements as a function of the…
We analyze the problem of locating a public facility on a line in a society where agents have either single-peaked or single-dipped preferences. We consider the domain analyzed in Alcalde-Unzu et al. (2024), where the type of preference of…
We study Nash equilibria in strategic facility location games where clients are located in an arbitrary metric space. Specifically, there are $n$ clients, and the goal is to choose a facility from a set of given locations, so that the total…
We analyze the problem of locating a public facility in a domain of single-peaked and single-dipped preferences when the social planner knows the type of preference (single-peaked or single-dipped) of each agent. Our main result…
We study a variation of facility location problems (FLPs) that aims to improve the accessibility of agents to the facility within the context of mechanism design without money. In such a variation, agents have preferences on the ideal…
We initiate the study of matching roommates and rooms wherein the preferences of agents over other agents and rooms are complementary and represented by Leontief utilities. In this setting, 2n agents must be paired up and assigned to n…
Classical stability theory for stochastic programming relies on the Wasserstein-Fortet-Mourier duality, which requires the ground cost to be a distance. When using problem-dependent costs instead of metrics, this duality no longer yields…
We study Facility Location with Matching, a Facility Location problem where, given additional information about which pair of clients is compatible to be matched, we need to match as many clients as possible and assign each matched client…
We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility…
This paper studies the problem of minimizing group-level inequity in facility location games on the real line, where agents belong to different groups and may act strategically. We explore a fairness-oriented objective that minimizes the…
We consider a selfish variant of the knapsack problem. In our version, the items are owned by agents, and each agent can misrepresent the set of items she owns---either by avoiding reporting some of them (understating), or by reporting…
The facility location problem is an NP-hard optimization problem. Therefore, approximation algorithms are often used to solve large instances. Such algorithms often perform much better than worst-case analysis suggests. Therefore,…