Related papers: Adaptive Two-sided Assortment Optimization: Revenu…
Two-sided online matching platforms are employed in various markets. However, agents' preferences in the current market are usually implicit and unknown, thus needing to be learned from data. With the growing availability of dynamic side…
We consider a dynamic system with multiple types of customers and servers. Each type of waiting customer or server joins a separate queue, forming a bipartite graph with customer-side queues and server-side queues. The platform can match…
Scalable real-time assortment optimization has become essential in e-commerce operations due to the need for personalization and the availability of a large variety of items. While this can be done when there are simplistic assortment…
We study how to maximize the broker's (expected) profit in a two-sided market, where she buys items from a set of sellers and resells them to a set of buyers. Each seller has a single item to sell and holds a private value on her item, and…
In this paper, we propose a new recommendation algorithm for addressing the problem of two-sided online matching markets with complementary preferences and quota constraints, where agents' preferences are unknown a priori and must be…
Matching algorithms have demonstrated great success in several practical applications, but they often require centralized coordination and plentiful information. In many modern online marketplaces, agents must independently seek out and…
This paper introduces a dual-based algorithm framework for solving the regularized online resource allocation problems, which have potentially non-concave cumulative rewards, hard resource constraints, and a non-separable regularizer. Under…
The assortment problem in revenue management is the problem of deciding which subset of products to offer to consumers in order to maximise revenue. A simple and natural strategy is to select the best assortment out of all those that are…
For online resource allocation problems, we propose a new demand arrival model where the sequence of arrivals contains both an adversarial component and a stochastic one. Our model requires no demand forecasting; however, due to the…
It was recently shown in [http://arxiv.org/abs/1207.5518] that revenue optimization can be computationally efficiently reduced to welfare optimization in all multi-dimensional Bayesian auction problems with arbitrary (possibly…
We study the distortion of one-sided and two-sided matching problems on the line. In the one-sided case, $n$ agents need to be matched to $n$ items, and each agent's cost in a matching is their distance from the item they were matched to.…
We study the problem of computing maximin share guarantees, a recently introduced fairness notion. Given a set of $n$ agents and a set of goods, the maximin share of a single agent is the best that she can guarantee to herself, if she would…
Flexibility is a cornerstone of operations management, crucial to hedge stochasticity in product demands, service requirements, and resource allocation. In two-sided platforms, flexibility is also two-sided and can be viewed as the…
An approximation of strategyproofness in large, two-sided matching markets is highly evident. Through simulations, one can observe that the percentage of agents with useful deviations decreases as the market size grows. Furthermore, there…
We consider a matching system with random arrivals of items of different types. The items wait in queues -- one per each item type -- until they are "matched." Each matching requires certain quantities of items of different types; after a…
We advance a recently flourishing line of work at the intersection of learning theory and computational economics by studying the learnability of two classes of mechanisms prominent in economics, namely menus of lotteries and two-part…
We consider an assortment optimization problem where a customer chooses a single item from a sequence of sets shown to her, while limited inventories constrain the items offered to customers over time. In the special case where all of the…
We study approximation algorithms for revenue maximization based on static item pricing, where a seller chooses prices for various goods in the market, and then the buyers purchase utility-maximizing bundles at these given prices. We…
We design novel mechanisms for welfare-maximization in two-sided markets. That is, there are buyers willing to purchase items and sellers holding items initially, both acting rationally and strategically in order to maximize utility. Our…
We study the problem of matching agents who arrive at a marketplace over time and leave after d time periods. Agents can only be matched while they are present in the marketplace. Each pair of agents can yield a different match value, and…