Related papers: Coalitional stability under myopic expectations an…
In the multidimensional stable roommate problem, agents have to be allocated to rooms and have preferences over sets of potential roommates. We study the complexity of finding good allocations of agents to rooms under the assumption that…
In Cooperative Games with Externalities when the members of a set S \subset N of agents wish to deviate they need to calculate their worth. This worth depends on what the non-members (outsiders) N \setminus S will do, which in turn depends…
In a many-to-one matchingmodel with responsive preferences in which indifferences are allowed, we study three notions of core, three notions of stability, and their relationships. We show that (i) the core contains the stable set, (ii) the…
Hedonic games provide a general model of coalition formation, in which a set of agents is partitioned into coalitions, with each agent having preferences over which other players are in her coalition. We prove that with additively separable…
We consider abstract-argumentation-theoretic coalition formability in this work. Taking a model from political alliance among political parties, we will contemplate profitability, and then formability, of a coalition. As is commonly…
We extend well-known comparative results under expected utility to models of non-expected utility by providing novel conditions on local utility functions. We illustrate how our results parallel, and are distinct from, existing results for…
Bell non-local correlations cannot be naturally explained in a fixed causal structure. This serves as a motivation for considering models where no global assumption is made beyond logical consistency. The assumption of a fixed causal order…
Cooperative games model the allocation of profit from joint actions, following considerations such as stability and fairness. We propose the reliability extension of such games, where agents may fail to participate in the game. In the…
Many-to-many matching with contracts is studied in the framework of revealed preferences. All preferences are described by choice functions that satisfy natural conditions. Under a no-externality assumption individual preferences can be…
In this paper we address the problem of coalition formation in hedonic context. Our modelling tries to be as realistic as possible. In previous models, once an agent joins a coalition it would not be able to leave the coalition and join the…
A group of $n$ agents with numerical preferences for each other are to be assigned to the $n$ seats of a dining table. We study two natural topologies:~circular (cycle) tables and panel (path) tables. For a given seating arrangement, an…
Hedonic games are an archetypal problem in coalition formation, where a set of selfish agents want to partition themselves into stable coalitions. In this work, we focus on two natural constraints on the possible outcomes. First, we require…
In this paper we provide a first-ever epistemic formulation of stabilizing agreement, defined as the non-terminating variant of the well established consensus problem. In stabilizing agreements, agents are given (possibly different) initial…
We consider a wireless network in which there is a transmitter and a set of users, all of whom want to download a popular file from the transmitter. Using the framework of cooperative game theory, we investigate conditions under which users…
Hedonic games -- at the interface of cooperative game theory and computational social choice -- are coalition formation games in which the players have preferences over the coalitions they can join. Kerkmann et al. [13] introduced…
Traditionally social sciences are interested in structuring people in multiple groups based on their individual preferences. This pa- per suggests an approach to this problem in the framework of a non- cooperative game theory. Definition of…
We study the two-sided stable matching problem with one-sided uncertainty for two sets of agents A and B, with equal cardinality. Initially, the preference lists of the agents in A are given but the preferences of the agents in B are…
We propose a notion of a stable partition in a coalitional game that is parametrized by the concept of a defection function. This function assigns to each partition of the grand coalition a set of different coalition arrangements for a…
Stability results for extremum seeking control in $\mathbb{R}^n$ have predominantly been restricted to local or, at best, semi-global practical stability. Extending semi-global stability results of extremum-seeking systems to unbounded sets…
Political actors form coalitions around their joint normative beliefs in order to influence the policy process on contentious issues such as climate change or population ageing. Policy process theory maintains that learning within and…