Related papers: Iterative Vickrey Auctions via Linear Programming
With the recent technological feasibility of electronic commerce over the Internet, much attention has been given to the design of electronic markets for various types of electronically-tradable goods. Such markets, however, will normally…
In this paper, we study sequential auctions with two budget constrained bidders and any number of identical items. All prior results on such auctions consider only two items. We construct a canonical outcome of the auction that is the only…
Periodic double auctions (PDA) have applications in many areas such as in e-commerce, intra-day equity markets, and day-ahead energy markets in smart-grids. While the trades accomplished using PDAs are worth trillions of dollars, finding a…
In industrial scenarios involving multi-agent collective decision-making, centralized decision-making may not be admissible due to restrictive access to individual local information, while the conflicts between participants' self-interest…
We study the design of truthful auctions for selling identical items in unlimited supply (e.g., digital goods) to n unit demand buyers. This classic problem stands out from profit-maximizing auction design literature as it requires no…
In recommendation systems, the relevance and novelty of the final results are selected through a cascade system of Matching -> Ranking -> Strategy. The matching model serves as the starting point of the pipeline and determines the upper…
Procuring agricultural inputs (agri-inputs for short) such as seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides, at desired quality levels and at affordable cost, forms a critical component of agricultural input operations. This is a particularly…
We study revenue optimization pricing algorithms for repeated posted-price auctions where a seller interacts with a single strategic buyer that holds a fixed private valuation. We show that, in the case when both the seller and the buyer…
Sponsored search auctions constitute one of the most successful applications of microeconomic mechanisms. In mechanism design, auctions are usually designed to incentivize advertisers to bid their truthful valuations and to assure both the…
We consider an outsourcing problem where a software agent procures multiple services from providers with uncertain reliabilities to complete a computational task before a strict deadline. The service consumer requires a procurement strategy…
Many advertisers buy advertisements (ads) on the Internet or on traditional media and seek simple, online mechanisms to reserve ad slots in advance. Media publishers represent a vast and varying inventory, and they too seek automatic,…
We derive optimal strategies for a bidding agent that participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We prove that, if everyone else bids locally in a single auction, the global bidder should always…
Currently, most ISOs adopt offer cost minimization (OCM) auction mechanism which minimizes the total offer cost, and then, a settlement rule based on either locational marginal prices (LMPs) or market clearing price (MCP) is used to…
Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenue is an intricate task. The single-item case was resolved in a seminal piece of work by Myerson in 1981, but more than 40 years later a full analytical understanding of…
This paper proposes a market mechanism for multi-interval electricity markets with generator and storage participants. Drawing ideas from supply function bidding, we introduce a novel bid structure for storage participation that allows…
When agents with independent priors bid for a single item, Myerson's optimal auction maximizes expected revenue, whereas Vickrey's second-price auction optimizes social welfare. We address the natural question of trade-offs between the two…
We study the computation of competitive equilibrium for Fisher markets with $n$ agents and $m$ divisible chores. Competitive equilibria for chores are known to correspond to the nonzero KKT points of a program that minimizes the product of…
The connection between games and no-regret algorithms has been widely studied in the literature. A fundamental result is that when all players play no-regret strategies, this produces a sequence of actions whose time-average is a…
This paper studies Markov perfect equilibria in a repeated duopoly model where sellers choose algorithms. An algorithm is a mapping from the competitor's price to own price. Once set, algorithms respond quickly. Customers arrive randomly…
We design a framework for truthful double multi-channel spectrum auctions where each seller (or buyer) can sell (or buy) multiple spectrum channels based on their individual needs. Open, market-based spectrum trading motivates existing…