Related papers: Iterative Vickrey Auctions via Linear Programming
In the customary VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism truth-telling is a dominant strategy. In this paper we study the sequential VCG mechanism and show that other dominant strategies may then exist. We illustrate how this fact can be used…
We present our results on Uniform Price Auctions, one of the standard sealed-bid multi-unit auction formats, for selling multiple identical units of a single good to multi-demand bidders. Contrary to the truthful and economically efficient…
Sequential auctions for identical items with unit-demand, private-value buyers are common and often occur periodically without end, as new bidders replace departing ones. We model bidder uncertainty by introducing a probability that a…
In this paper, we develop a new method for finding an optimal biddingstrategy in sequential auctions, using a dynamic programming technique. Theexisting method assumes that the utility of a user is represented in anadditive form. Thus, the…
Online platforms connect users with relevant products and services using ads. A key challenge is that a user's search query often leaves their true intent ambiguous. Typically, platforms passively predict relevance based on available…
In a sponsored search auction, decisions about how to rank ads impose tradeoffs between objectives such as revenue and welfare. In this paper, we examine how these tradeoffs should be made. We begin by arguing that the most natural solution…
We study the social efficiency of several well-known mechanisms for the allocation of a set of available (advertising) positions to a set of competing budget-constrained users (advertisers). Specifically, we focus on the Generalized Second…
Network utility maximization (NUM) is a general framework for designing distributed optimization algorithms for large-scale networks. An economic challenge arises in the presence of strategic agents' private information. Existing studies…
The Empirical Revenue Maximization (ERM) is one of the most important price learning algorithms in auction design: as the literature shows it can learn approximately optimal reserve prices for revenue-maximizing auctioneers in both repeated…
This paper examines knapsack auctions as a method to solve the knapsack problem with incomplete information, where object values are private and sizes are public. We analyze three auction types-uniform price (UP), discriminatory price (DP),…
In this article we consider combinatorial markets with valuations only for singletons and pairs of buy/sell-orders for swapping two items in equal quantity. We provide an algorithm that permits polynomial time market-clearing and -pricing.…
We study online combinatorial auctions with production costs proposed by Blum et al. using the online primal dual framework. In this model, buyers arrive online, and the seller can produce multiple copies of each item subject to a…
Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenue is a central problem in Auction Design. While theoretical approaches to the problem have hit some limits, a recent research direction initiated by Duetting et al.…
Equilibrium problems in Bayesian auction games can be described as systems of differential equations. Depending on the model assumptions, these equations might be such that we do not have a rigorous mathematical solution theory. The lack of…
We study buyer-optimal procurement mechanisms when quality is contractible. When some costs are borne by every participant of a procurement auction regardless of winning, the classic analysis should be amended. We show that an optimal…
The Internet of Vehicles (IoV) is undergoing a transformative evolution, enabled by advancements in future 6G network technologies, to support intelligent, highly reliable, and low-latency vehicular services. However, the enhanced…
Motivated by the dynamic assortment offerings and item pricings occurring in e-commerce, we study a general problem of allocating finite inventories to heterogeneous customers arriving sequentially. We analyze this problem under the…
Bulow and Klemperer's well-known result states that, in a single-item auction where the $n$ bidders' values are independently and identically drawn from a regular distribution, the Vickrey auction with one additional bidder (a duplicate)…
We consider the design of computationally efficient online learning algorithms in an adversarial setting in which the learner has access to an offline optimization oracle. We present an algorithm called Generalized…
The commercialization of LLM applications is the next frontier in online advertising, with LLM-native advertising emerging as a promising paradigm by integrating ads into LLM-generated content. However, classic mechanisms are no longer…