Related papers: Local Strategy-proofness and Dictatorship
An important feature of many real world facility location problems are capacity limits on the facilities. We show here how capacity constraints make it harder to design strategy proof mechanisms for facility location, but…
Bipartite networks are powerful descriptions of complex systems characterized by two different classes of nodes and connections allowed only across but not within the two classes. Surprisingly, current complex network theory presents a…
Two important requirements when aggregating the preferences of multiple agents are that the outcome should be economically efficient and the aggregation mechanism should not be manipulable. In this paper, we provide a computer-aided proof…
In various application fields, such as fluid-, cell-, or crowd-simulations, spatial data structures are very important. They answer nearest neighbor queries which are instrumental in performing necessary computations for, e.g., taking the…
Several rules for social choice are examined from a unifying point of view that looks at them as procedures for revising a system of degrees of belief in accordance with certain specified logical constraints. Belief is here a social…
We study the setting of committee elections, where a group of individuals needs to collectively select a given size subset of available objects. This model is relevant for a number of real-life scenarios including political elections,…
We study the efficiency (in terms of social welfare) of truthful and symmetric mechanisms in one-sided matching problems with {\em dichotomous preferences} and {\em normalized von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences}. We are particularly…
Model theoretic results such as Characterization and Definability give important information about different logics. It is well known that the proofs of those results for several modal logics have, somehow, the same 'taste'. A general proof…
We propose a conformity-driven reproductive ability in which an individual $i$ is more (less) likely to imitate a neighbor $j$'s strategy if $j$'s strategy is majority (minority) in $i$'s neighborhood. The results on the evolutionary…
We consider a strategic variant of the facility location problem. We would like to locate a facility on a closed interval. There are n agents located on that interval, divided into two types: type 1 agents, who wish for the facility to be…
One-sided matching mechanisms are fundamental for assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of self-interested agents when monetary transfers are not allowed. Two widely-studied randomized mechanisms in multiagent settings are the…
Learning from Preferential Feedback (LfPF) plays an essential role in training Large Language Models, as well as certain types of interactive learning agents. However, a substantial gap exists between the theory and application of LfPF…
In the problem of aggregating experts' probabilistic predictions over an ordered set of outcomes, we introduce the axiom of level-strategy\-proofness (level-SP) and prove that it is a natural notion with several applications. Moreover, it…
By endowing the class of tops-only and efficient social choice rules with a dual order structure that exploits the trade-off between different degrees of manipulability and dictatorial power rules allow agents to have, we provide a proof of…
We study a class of preference domains that satisfies the familiar properties of minimal richness, diversity and no-restoration. We show that a specific preference restriction, hybridness, has been embedded in these domains so that the…
We study the design of one-to-one matching mechanisms that are strategy-proof for both sides and as stable as possible. Motivated by the impossibility result of Roth (1982), we formulate the mechanism design problem as a linear program that…
Agents vote to choose a fair mixture of public outcomes; each agent likes or dislikes each outcome. We discuss three outstanding voting rules. The Conditional Utilitarian rule, a variant of the random dictator, is Strategyproof and…
We study first-order logic over unordered structures whose elements carry a finite number of data values from an infinite domain. Data values can be compared wrt.\ equality. As the satisfiability problem for this logic is undecidable in…
There are many situations in which mis-coordinated strategic voting can leave strategic voters worse off than they would have been had they not tried to strategize. We analyse the simplest of such scenarios, in which the set of strategic…
This paper contains an extensive combinatorial analysis of the single-peaked domain restriction and investigates the likelihood that an election is single-peaked. We provide a very general upper bound result for domain restrictions that can…