Related papers: Multi-to -one dimensional and semi-discrete screen…
We study optimal bundling when consumers differ in one dimension. We introduce a partial order on the set of bundles defined by (i) set inclusion and (ii) sales volumes (if sold alone and priced optimally). We show that if the undominated…
I introduce and study a nested search problem modeled as a tree structure that generalizes Weitzman (1979) in two ways: (1) search progresses incrementally, reflecting real-life scenarios where agents gradually acquire information about the…
A monopolist wishes to maximize her profits by finding an optimal price policy. After she announces a menu of products and prices, each agent $x$ will choose to buy that product $y(x)$ which maximizes his own utility, if positive. The…
We consider the number of configurations of a surface in two dimensions that has a prescribed length and encloses a prescribed perimeter with respect to a baseline. An approximate analytical treatment in a semi--continuum compares…
Stochastic choice-based discrete planning is a broad class of decision-making problems characterized by a sequential decision-making process involving a planner and a group of customers. The firm or planner first decides a subset of options…
We consider a principal who wishes to screen an agent with \emph{discrete} types by offering a menu of \emph{discrete} quantities and \emph{discrete} transfers. We assume that the principal's valuation is discrete strictly concave and use a…
A monopolist offers personalized prices to consumers with unit demand, heterogeneous values, and idiosyncratic costs, who differ in a protected characteristic, such as race or gender. The seller is subject to a non-discrimination…
We show that the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling multiple, heterogeneous objects to a buyer with ex ante symmetric and additive values is equivalent to the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling identical…
We study a screening problem in which an agent privately observes a set of feasible technologies and can strategically disclose only a subset to the principal. The principal then takes an action whose payoff consequences for both players…
We study the efficiency of allocations in large markets with a network structure where every seller owns an edge in a graph and every buyer desires a path connecting some nodes. While it is known that stable allocations in such settings can…
In a containment problem, the goal is to preprocess a set of geometric objects so that, given a geometric query object, we can report all the objects containing the query object. We consider the containment problem where input objects are…
We study a class of semi-discrete variational problems that arise in economic matching and game theory, where agents with continuous attributes are matched to a finite set of outcomes with a one dimensional structure. Such problems appear…
I study symmetric competitions in which each player chooses an arbitrary distribution over a one-dimensional performance index, subject to a convex cost. I establish existence of a symmetric equilibrium, document various properties it must…
We consider a multiproduct monopoly pricing model. We provide sufficient conditions under which the optimal mechanism can be implemented via upgrade pricing -- a menu of product bundles that are nested in the strong set order. Our approach…
Due to numerous applications in retail and (online) advertising the problem of assortment selection has been widely studied under many combinations of discrete choice models and feasibility constraints. In many situations, however, an…
We study the question of testing structured properties (classes) of discrete distributions. Specifically, given sample access to an arbitrary distribution $D$ over $[n]$ and a property $\mathcal{P}$, the goal is to distinguish between…
A monopoly seller is privately and imperfectly informed about the buyer's value of the product. The seller uses information to price discriminate the buyer. A designer offers a mechanism that provides the seller with additional information…
We study how to optimally segment monopolistic markets with a redistributive objective. We characterize optimal redistributive segmentations and show that they (i) induce the seller to price progressively, i.e., charge richer consumers…
We introduce the notion of a multidimensional hybrid preference domain on a (finite) set of alternatives that is a Cartesian product of finitely many components. We demonstrate that in a model of public goods provision, multidimensional…
The problem of minimizing a multilinear function of binary variables is a well-studied NP-hard problem. The set of solutions of the standard linearization of this problem is called the multilinear set. We study a cardinality constrained…