Related papers: Non-Discriminatory Personalized Pricing
We study the economic interactions among sellers and buyers in online markets. In such markets, buyers have limited information about the product quality, but can observe the sellers' reputations which depend on their past transaction…
A monopolist seller of multiple goods screens a buyer whose type is initially unknown to both but drawn from a commonly known distribution. The buyer privately learns about his type via a signal. We derive the seller's optimal mechanism in…
We study large markets with a single seller which can produce many types of goods, and many multi-minded buyers. The seller chooses posted prices for its many items, and the buyers purchase bundles to maximize their utility. For this…
Algorithmic recommender systems such as Spotify and Netflix affect not only consumer behavior but also producer incentives. Producers seek to create content that will be shown by the recommendation algorithm, which can impact both the…
Pricing decisions stand out as one of the most critical tasks a company faces, particularly in today's digital economy. As with other business decision-making problems, pricing unfolds in a highly competitive and uncertain environment.…
We study the effects of allowing paid prioritization arrangements in a market with content provider (CP) competition. We consider competing CPs who pay prioritization fees to a monopolistic ISP so as to offset the ISP's cost for investing…
We consider a monopoly insurance market with a risk-neutral profit-maximizing insurer and a consumer with Yaari Dual Utility preferences that distort the given continuous loss distribution. The insurer observes the loss distribution but not…
Consumers only discover at the first seller which product best fits their needs, then check its price online, then decide on buying. Switching sellers is costly. Equilibrium prices fall in the switching cost, eventually to the monopoly…
Extensive research shows that consumers are generally averse to price discrimination. However, instruments of differential pricing can benefit consumer surplus and alleviate inequity through targeted price discounts. This paper examines how…
The question we raise through this paper is: Is it economically feasible to trade consumer personal information with their formal consent (permission) and in return provide them incentives (monetary or otherwise)?. In view of (a) the…
We consider a model of a data broker selling information to a single agent to maximize his revenue. The agent has a private valuation of the additional information, and upon receiving the signal from the data broker, the agent can conduct…
Data buyers compete in a game of incomplete information about which a single data seller owns some payoff-relevant information. The seller faces a joint information- and mechanism-design problem: deciding which information to sell, while…
We consider a model of oligopolistic competition in a market with search frictions, in which competing firms with products of unknown quality advertise how much information a consumer's visit will glean. In the unique symmetric equilibrium…
This paper examines whether one can learn to play an optimal action while only knowing part of true specification of the environment. We choose the optimal pricing problem as our laboratory, where the monopolist is endowed with an…
A seller chooses a reserve price in a second-price auction to maximize worst-case expected revenue when she knows only the mean of value distribution and an upper bound on either values themselves or variance. Values are private and iid.…
Traditional user profiling techniques rely on browsing history or purchase records to identify users' willingness to pay. This enables sellers to offer personalized prices to profiled users while charging only a uniform price to…
Can competition among misaligned AI providers yield aligned outcomes for a diverse population of users, and what role does model personalization play? We study a setting where multiple competing AI providers interact with multiple users who…
We consider a model of third-degree price discrimination where the seller's product valuation is unknown to the market designer, who aims to maximize buyer surplus by revealing buyer valuation information. Our main result shows that the…
Interactions between bids to show ads online can lead to an advertiser's ad being shown to more men than women even when the advertiser does not target towards men. We design bidding strategies that advertisers can use to avoid such…
A small investor provides liquidity at the best bid and ask prices of a limit order market. For small spreads and frequent orders of other market participants, we explicitly determine the investor's optimal policy and welfare. In doing so,…