Related papers: Interim correlated rationalizability in large game…
We study strategic interaction in data-driven games where players face uncertainty about payoff distributions inferred from finite samples. To model calibrated attitudes toward such uncertainty, we formulate distributionally robust games…
Correlated Equilibrium is a solution concept that is more general than Nash Equilibrium (NE) and can lead to outcomes with better social welfare. However, its natural extension to the sequential setting, the \textit{Extensive Form…
We study a setting in which two players play a (possibly approximate) Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game, while a learner observes only their actions and has no knowledge of the equilibrium or the underlying game. A natural question is…
Public goods games study the incentives of individuals to contribute to a public good and their behaviors in equilibria. In this paper, we examine a specific type of public goods game where players are networked and each has binary actions,…
Causal reasoning and game-theoretic reasoning are fundamental topics in artificial intelligence, among many other disciplines: this paper is concerned with their intersection. Despite their importance, a formal framework that supports both…
We present a unified framework for characterizing local Nash equilibria in continuous games on either infinite-dimensional or finite-dimensional non-convex strategy spaces. We provide intrinsic necessary and sufficient first- and…
We propose a framework to compute approximate Nash equilibria in integer programming games with nonlinear payoffs, i.e., simultaneous and non-cooperative games where each player solves a parametrized mixed-integer nonlinear program. We…
Many important real-world settings contain multiple players interacting over an unknown duration with probabilistic state transitions, and are naturally modeled as stochastic games. Prior research on algorithms for stochastic games has…
We study Bayesian coordination games where agents receive noisy private information over the game's payoffs, and over each others' actions. If private information over actions is of low quality, equilibrium uniqueness obtains in a manner…
We study the computational complexity of Nash equilibria in concurrent games with limit-average objectives. In particular, we prove that the existence of a Nash equilibrium in randomised strategies is undecidable, while the existence of a…
When two or more self-interested agents put their plans to execution in the same environment, conflicts may arise as a consequence, for instance, of a common utilization of resources. In this case, an agent can postpone the execution of a…
Various social contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection can be depicted as games of strategic interactions, where a player's well-being depends on her own action as well as on the actions taken by her…
Game-theoretic concepts have been extensively studied in economics to provide insight into competitive behaviour and strategic decision making. As computing systems increasingly involve concurrently acting autonomous agents, game-theoretic…
In this paper, we study the problem of the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking of N-player games over jointly strongly connected switching networks. The action of each player is governed by a class of uncertain nonlinear systems. Our…
We present a framework that incorporates the idea of bounded rationality into dynamic stochastic pursuit-evasion games. The solution of a stochastic game is characterized, in general, by its (Nash) equilibria in feedback form. However,…
The paper addresses a problem of sequential bilateral bargaining with incomplete information. We proposed a decision model that helps agents to successfully bargain by performing indirect negotiation and learning the opponent's model.…
Repeated game has long been the touchstone model for agents' long-run relationships. Previous results suggest that it is particularly difficult for a repeated game player to exert an autocratic control on the payoffs since they are jointly…
We introduce the notion of exchangeable equilibria of a symmetric bimatrix game, defined as those correlated equilibria in which players' strategy choices are conditionally independently and identically distributed given some hidden…
In games with a large number of players where players may have overlapping objectives, the analysis of stable outcomes typically depends on player types. A special case is when a large part of the player population consists of imitation…
We study the asymptotic organization among many optimizing individuals interacting in a suitable "moderate" way. We justify this limiting game by proving that its solution provides approximate Nash equilibria for large but finite player…