Related papers: Interim correlated rationalizability in large game…
Optimal behavior in (competitive) situation is traditionally determined with the help of utility functions that measure the payoff of different actions. Given an ordering on the space of revenues (payoffs), the classical axiomatic approach…
We consider a large population dynamic game in discrete time. The peculiarity of the game is that players are characterized by time-evolving types, and so reasonably their actions should not anticipate the future values of their types. When…
Compositional Game Theory is a new, recently introduced model of economic games based upon the computer science idea of compositionality. In it, complex and irregular games can be built up from smaller and simpler games, and the equilibria…
Network games provide a natural machinery to compactly represent strategic interactions among agents whose payoffs exhibit sparsity in their dependence on the actions of others. Besides encoding interaction sparsity, however, real networks…
Finite objects and more specifically finite games are formalized using induction, whereas infinite objects are formalized using coinduction. In this article, after an introduction to the concept of coinduction, we revisit on infinite…
We present an index theory of equilibria for extensive form games. This requires developing an index theory for games where the strategy sets of players are general polytopes and their payoff functions are multiaffine in the product of…
Strategic games admit a multi-graph representation, in which two kinds of relations, accessibility, and preferences, are used to describe how the players compare the possible outcomes. A category of games with a fixed set of players…
Secure equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, which provides some security to the players against deviations when a player changes his strategy to another best response strategy. The concept of secure equilibrium is specifically…
We consider potential games with mixed-integer variables, for which we propose two distributed, proximal-like equilibrium seeking algorithms. Specifically, we focus on two scenarios: i) the underlying game is generalized ordinal and the…
Aggregative games have many industrial applications, and computing an equilibrium in those games is challenging when the number of players is large. In the framework of atomic aggregative games with coupling constraints, we show that…
In this work, we introduce graphical modelsfor multi-player game theory, and give powerful algorithms for computing their Nash equilibria in certain cases. An n-player game is given by an undirected graph on n nodes and a set of n local…
Coordination games have been of interest to game theorists, economists, and ecologists for many years to study such problems as the emergence of local conventions and the evolution of cooperative behavior. Approaches for understanding the…
Strategic-form min-max game theory examines the existence, multiplicity, selection of equilibria, and the worst-case computational complexity under perfect rationality. However, in many applications, games are drawn from an ensemble, and…
The game-theoretic risk management framework put forth in the precursor reports "Towards a Theory of Games with Payoffs that are Probability-Distributions" (arXiv:1506.07368 [q-fin.EC]) and "Algorithms to Compute Nash-Equilibria in Games…
The recently defined class of integer programming games (IPG) models situations where multiple self-interested decision makers interact, with their strategy sets represented by a finite set of linear constraints together with integer…
Game theory relies heavily on the availability of cardinal utility functions, but in fields such as matching markets, only ordinal preferences are typically elicited. The literature focuses on mechanisms with simple dominant strategies, but…
Although it has been known since the 1970s that a globally optimal strategy profile in a common-payoff game is a Nash equilibrium, global optimality is a strict requirement that limits the result's applicability. In this work, we show that…
Stochastic games generalize Markov decision processes (MDPs) to a multiagent setting by allowing the state transitions to depend jointly on all player actions, and having rewards determined by multiplayer matrix games at each state. We…
As part of an effort to apply the rigorous guarantees of formal verification to multi-agent systems, the field of equilibrium analysis, also called rational verification, studies equilibria in multiplayer games to reason about system-level…
In the context of simple finite-state discrete time systems, we introduce a generalization of mean field game solution, called correlated solution, which can be seen as the mean field game analogue of a correlated equilibrium. Our notion of…