Related papers: The Implementability of Liberalism
We show that under some general conditions the finite memory determinacy of a class of two-player win/lose games played on finite graphs implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium built from finite memory strategies for the corresponding…
We generalize the classic problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to the problem of \emph{fair public decision making}, in which a decision must be made on several social issues simultaneously, and, unlike the classic setting, a…
We study a multi-player stochastic differential game, where agents interact through their joint price impact on an asset that they trade to exploit a common trading signal. In this context, we prove that a closed-loop Nash equilibrium…
We study incentive-compatible mechanisms that maximize the Nash Social Welfare. Since traditional incentive-compatible mechanisms cannot maximize the Nash Social Welfare even approximately, we propose changing the traditional model.…
LLM agents are known to deviate from Nash equilibria in strategic interactions, but nobody has looked inside the model to understand why, or asked whether the deviation can be reversed. We do both. Working with four open-source models…
Social networks are increasingly being used to conduct polls. We introduce a simple model of such social polling. We suppose agents vote sequentially, but the order in which agents choose to vote is not necessarily fixed. We also suppose…
Empirical studies suggest a deep intertwining between opinion formation and decision-making processes, but these have been treated as separate problems in the study of dynamical models for social networks. In this paper, we bridge the gap…
Fictitious play is a popular learning algorithm in which players that utilize the history of actions played by the players and the knowledge of their own payoff matrix can converge to the Nash equilibrium under certain conditions on the…
A growing body of literature in networked systems research relies on game theory and mechanism design to model and address the potential lack of cooperation between self-interested users. Most game-theoretic models applied to system…
We show that under some general conditions the finite memory determinacy of a class of two-player win/lose games played on finite graphs implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium built from finite memory strategies for the corresponding…
We consider a notion of rationalizability, where the rationalizing relation may depend on the set of feasible alternatives. More precisely, we say that a choice function is locally rationalizable if it is rationalized by a family of…
Nash equilibrium is the most commonly-used notion of equilibrium in game theory. However, it suffers from numerous problems. Some are well known in the game theory community; for example, the Nash equilibrium of repeated prisoner's dilemma…
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem implies the existence of voters, called manipulators, who can change the election outcome in their favour by voting strategically. When a given preference profile admits several such manipulators, voting…
We propose a novel method to find Nash equilibria in games with binary decision variables by including compensation payments and incentive-compatibility constraints from non-cooperative game theory directly into an optimization framework in…
The Maskin's theorem is a fundamental work in the theory of mechanism design. In this paper, we propose that if agents report messages to the designer through channels (e.g., Internet), agents can construct a self-enforcing agreement such…
We study a mechanism design problem where a community of agents wishes to fund public projects via voluntary monetary contributions by the community members. This serves as a model for public expenditure without an exogenously available…
This paper proposes a novel energy sharing mechanism for prosumers who can produce and consume. Different from most existing works, the role of individual prosumer as a seller or buyer in our model is endogenously determined. Several…
Actual individual preferences are neither complete (=total) nor antisymmetric in general, so that at least every quasi-order must be an admissible input to a satisfactory choice rule. It is argued that the traditional notion of…
We consider a market in which both suppliers and consumers compete for a product via scalar-parameterized supply offers and demand bids. Scalar-parameterized offers/bids are appealing due to their modeling simplicity and desirable…
We study noncooperative games, in which each player's objective is composed of a sequence of ordered- and potentially conflicting-preferences. Problems of this type naturally model a wide variety of scenarios: for example, drivers at a busy…