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We study a novel general class of multidimensional type-I backward stochastic Volterra integral equations. Toward this goal, we introduce an infinite dimensional system of standard backward SDEs and establish its well-posedness, and we show…
In this paper, we investigate the seeking of Nash equilibrium (NE) in a non-cooperative quadratic game where all agents exchange their delayed strategy information with their neighbors. To extend best-response algorithms to the delayed…
In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with mean-payoff objectives. To this end, we introduce the notion of requirement, and the…
We formulate a Stackelberg game between an attacker and a defender of a power system. The attacker attempts to alter the load setpoints of the power system covertly and intelligently, so that the voltage stability margin of the grid is…
In this paper we introduce a completely continuous and time-variate model of the evolution of market limit orders based on the existence, uniqueness, and regularity of the solutions to a type of stochastic partial differential equations…
We analyze a class of stochastic dynamic games among teams with asymmetric information, where members of a team share their observations internally with a delay of $d$. Each team is associated with a controlled Markov Chain, whose dynamics…
This paper considers the theoretical, computational, and econometric properties of continuous time dynamic discrete choice games with stochastically sequential moves, introduced by Arcidiacono, Bayer, Blevins, and Ellickson (2016). We…
We extend anytime constraints to the Markov game setting and the corresponding solution concept of an anytime-constrained equilibrium (ACE). Then, we present a comprehensive theory of anytime-constrained equilibria that includes (1) a…
The reliability and security of a user in an interconnected system depends on all users' collective effort in security. Consequently, investments in security technologies by strategic users is typically modeled as a public good problem,…
We study the problem of computing optimal correlated equilibria (CEs) in infinite-horizon multi-player stochastic games, where correlation signals are provided over time. In this setting, optimal CEs require history-dependent policies; this…
A backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE) is an SDE of the form $-dY_t = f(t,Y_t,Z_t)dt - Z_t^*dW_t;\ Y_T = \xi$. The subject of BSDEs has seen extensive attention since their introduction in the linear case by Bismut (1973) and in…
This paper introduces a new class of optimal switching problems, where the player is allowed to switch at a sequence of exogenous Poisson arrival times, and the underlying switching system is governed by an infinite horizon backward…
Solving feedback Stackelberg games with nonlinear dynamics and coupled constraints, a common scenario in practice, presents significant challenges. This work introduces an efficient method for computing approximate local feedback…
We apply Blackwell optimality to repeated games. An equilibrium whose strategy profile is sequentially rational for all high enough discount factors simultaneously is a Blackwell (subgame-perfect, perfect public, etc.) equilibrium. The bite…
We use a white noise approach to study the problem of optimal inside control of a stochastic delay equation driven by a Brownian motion B and a Poisson random measure N. In particular, we use Hida-Malliavin calculus and the Donsker delta…
In this paper, we consider a stochastic decision problem for a system governed by a stochastic differential equation, in which an optimal decision is made in such a way to minimize a vector-valued accumulated cost over a finite-time horizon…
This paper is concerned with zero-sum stochastic linear-quadratic differential games in a regime switching model. The coefficients of the games depend on the underlying noises, so it is a non-Markovian regime switching model. Based on the…
In~[1],authors considered a general finite horizon model of dynamic game of asymmetric information, where N players have types evolving as independent Markovian process, where each player observes its own type perfectly and actions of all…
We analyze linear McKean-Vlasov forward-backward SDEs arising in leader-follower games with mean-field type control and terminal state constraints on the state process. We establish an existence and uniqueness of solutions result for such…
We introduce a model of sender-receiver stopping games, where the state of the world follows an iid--process throughout the game. At each period, the sender observes the current state, and sends a message to the receiver, suggesting either…