Related papers: Equitable Mechanism Design for Facility Location
As a fundraising method, Initial Coin Offering (ICO) has raised billions of dollars for thousands of startups in the past two years. Existing ICO mechanisms place more emphasis on the short-term benefits of maximal fundraising while…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents in a fair and economically efficient manner. In this context, the Nash social welfare-defined as the geometric mean of agents' valuations for their assigned bundles-stands as…
We study the distributed facility location problem, where a set of agents with positions on the line of real numbers are partitioned into disjoint districts, and the goal is to choose a point to satisfy certain criteria, such as optimize an…
We study the efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism, that is widely used to allocate divisible resources. Each agent submits a bid for each divisible resource and receives a fraction proportional to her bids. We quantify the…
The facility location game has been studied extensively in mechanism design. In the classical model, each agent's cost is solely determined by her distance to the nearest facility. In this paper, we introduce a novel model where each…
This paper proposes a novel method to generate bid bounds that can serve as offer caps for energy storage in electricity markets to help reduce system costs and regulate potential market power exercises. We derive the bid bounds based on a…
In this paper, we study a truthful two-obnoxious-facility location problem, in which each agent has a private location in [0, 1] and a public optional preference over two obnoxious facilities, and there is a minimum distance constraint d…
We consider allocation of a resource to multiple interested users with a constraint that if the resource is allocated to user $i$ then it can not be allocated simultaneously to a predefined set of users $\cS_i$ . This scenario arises in…
How should cities invest to improve social welfare when individuals respond strategically to local conditions? We model this question using a game-theoretic version of Schelling's bounded neighbourhood model, where agents choose…
The key contribution of the paper is a comprehensive study of the egalitarian mechanism with respect to manipulation by a coalition of agents. Our main result is that the egalitarian mechanism is, in fact, peak group strategyproof : no…
We investigate the possibility of an incentive-compatible (IC, a.k.a. strategy-proof) mechanism for the classification of agents in a network according to their reviews of each other. In the $ \alpha $-classification problem we are…
We study a truthful two-facility location problem in which a set of agents have private positions on the line of real numbers and known approval preferences over two different facilities. Given the locations of the two facilities, the cost…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to agents with weights corresponding to their entitlements. Previous work has shown that, when agents have binary additive valuations, the maximum weighted Nash welfare rule is…
In this paper, we study the Facility Location Problem with Scarce Resources (FLPSR) under the assumption that agents' type follow a probability distribution. In the FLPSR, the objective is to identify the optimal locations for one or more…
We study the problem in which a central planner sequentially allocates a single resource to multiple strategic agents using their utility reports at each round, but without using any monetary transfers. We consider general agent utility…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible items to budget-constrained agents, aiming to provide fairness and efficiency guarantees. Specifically, our goal is to ensure that the resulting allocation is envy-free up to any item (EFx)…
In the private values single object auction model, we construct a satisfactory mechanism - a symmetric, dominant strategy incentive compatible, and budget-balanced mechanism. Our mechanism allocates the object to the highest valued agent…
We are interested in mechanisms that maximize social welfare. In [1] this problem was studied for multi-unit auctions with unit demand bidders and for the public project problem, and in each case social welfare undominated mechanisms in the…
Recent studies on disparate impact in machine learning applications have sparked a debate around the concept of fairness along with attempts to formalize its different criteria. Many of these approaches focus on reducing prediction errors…
We study the power of item-pricing as a tool for approximately optimizing social welfare in a combinatorial market. We consider markets with $m$ indivisible items and $n$ buyers. The goal is to set prices to the items so that, when agents…