Related papers: Longer Lists Yield Better Matchings
Recent studies on many-to-one matching markets have explored agents with flexible capacity and truthful preference reporting, focusing on mechanisms that jointly design capacities and select a matching. However, in real-world applications…
The rise of Large Language Models (LLMs) has driven progress in reasoning tasks -- from program synthesis to scientific hypothesis generation -- yet their ability to handle ranked preferences and structured algorithms in combinatorial…
Stable matching in a community consisting of men and women is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in 1962 in a seminal paper by Gale and Shapley, who…
We study the design of a decentralized two-sided matching market in which agents' search is guided by the platform. There are finitely many agent types, each with (potentially random) preferences drawn from known type-specific…
Becker (1973) presents a bilateral matching model in which scalar types describe agents. For this framework, he establishes the conditions under which positive sorting between agents' attributes is the unique market outcome. Becker's…
Complexity theory is a useful tool to study computational issues surrounding the elicitation of preferences, as well as the strategic manipulation of elections aggregating together preferences of multiple agents. We study here the…
Motivated by applications from gig economy and online marketplaces, we study a two-sided queueing system under joint pricing and matching controls. The queueing system is modeled by a bipartite graph, where the vertices represent customer…
We study the problem of aggregating individual preferences over alternatives into a collective ranking. A distinctive feature of our setting is that agents are matched to alternatives. Applications include rankings of colleges or academic…
A researcher observes a finite sequence of choices made by multiple agents in a binary-state environment. Agents maximize expected utilities that depend on their chosen alternative and the unknown underlying state. Agents learn about the…
This paper studies an online variant of the celebrated housing market problem, where each agent has a single house and seeks to exchange it for another based on her preferences. In this online setting, agents may arrive and depart at any…
The Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DAA) is the most widely accepted and used algorithm to match students, workers, or residents to colleges, firms or hospitals respectively. In this paper, we consider for the first time, the complexity of…
Strategy-proofness is a fundamental desideratum in mechanism design, ensuring truthful reporting and robust participation. Stability is another central requirement in matching markets, widely adopted in applications such as school choice…
We develop a general framework for incorporating distributional preferences in market design. We identify the structural properties of these preferences that guarantee the path independence of choice rules. In decentralized settings, a…
Strategic behavior in two-sided matching markets has been traditionally studied in a "one-sided" manipulation setting where the agent who misreports is also the intended beneficiary. Our work investigates "two-sided" manipulation of the…
We propose a pseudo-market solution to resource allocation problems subject to constraints. Our treatment of constraints is general: including bihierarchical constraints due to considerations of diversity in school choice, or scheduling in…
We revisit the well-studied problem of designing mechanisms for one-sided matching markets, where a set of $n$ agents needs to be matched to a set of $n$ heterogeneous items. Each agent $i$ has a value $v_{i,j}$ for each item $j$, and these…
We study the problem of locating a single facility on a real line based on the reports of self-interested agents, when agents have double-peaked preferences, with the peaks being on opposite sides of their locations. We observe that…
A key question concerning collective decisions is whether a social system can settle on the best available option when some members learn from others instead of evaluating the options on their own. This question is challenging to study, and…
The main objective of higher education is to provide quality education to students. One way to achieve highest level of quality in higher education system is by discovering knowledge for prediction regarding enrolment of students in a…
In a multi-party machine learning system, different parties cooperate on optimizing towards better models by sharing data in a privacy-preserving way. A major challenge in learning is the incentive issue. For example, if there is…