Related papers: Multi-Project Contracts
Reasoning and planning for mobile robots is a challenging problem, as the world evolves over time and thus the robot's goals may change. One technique to tackle this problem is goal reasoning, where the agent not only reasons about its…
Quantitative requirements play an important role in the context of multi-agent systems, where there is often a trade-off between the tasks of individual agents and the constraints that the agents must jointly adhere to. We study multi-agent…
Recent technology advances have enabled firms to flexibly process and analyze sophisticated employee performance data at a reduced and yet significant cost. We develop a theory of optimal incentive contracting where the monitoring…
The consensus control with optimal cost remains major challenging although consensus control problems have been well studied in recent years. In this paper, we study the consensus control of multi-agent system associated with a given cost…
We present a new model of collective decision making that captures important crowd-funding and donor coordination scenarios. In the setting, there is a set of projects (each with its own cost) and a set of agents (that have their budgets as…
We present the mathematical foundations of the contract-based model developed in the framework of the SPEEDS project. SPEEDS aims at developing methods and tools to support "speculative design", a design methodology in which distributed…
Modeling the preferences of agents over a set of alternatives is a principal concern in many areas. The dominant approach has been to find a single reward/utility function with the property that alternatives yielding higher rewards are…
Multi-agent optimization problems with many objective functions have drawn much interest over the past two decades. Many works on the subject minimize the sum of objective functions, which implicitly carries a decision about the problem…
We consider the mechanism design problem of a principal allocating a single good to one of several agents without monetary transfers. Each agent desires the good and uses it to create value for the principal. We designate this value as the…
In this paper, we consider the problem of a Principal aiming at designing a reward function for a population of heterogeneous agents. We construct an incentive based on the ranking of the agents, so that a competition among the latter is…
We study online combinatorial allocation problems in the secretary setting, under interdependent values. In the interdependent model, introduced by Milgrom and Weber (1982), each agent possesses a private signal that captures her…
One obstacle to applying reinforcement learning algorithms to real-world problems is the lack of suitable reward functions. Designing such reward functions is difficult in part because the user only has an implicit understanding of the task…
We study the problem of fairly assigning a set of discrete tasks (or chores) among a set of agents with additive valuations. Each chore is associated with a start and finish time, and each agent can perform at most one chore at any given…
We consider the problem of producing fair probabilistic classifiers for multi-class classification tasks. We formulate this problem in terms of "projecting" a pre-trained (and potentially unfair) classifier onto the set of models that…
To successfully complete a complex project, be it a construction of an airport or of a backbone IT system, agents (companies or individuals) must form a team having required competences and resources. A team can be formed either by the…
While the auto-bidding literature predominantly considers independent bidding, we investigate the coordination problem among multiple auto-bidders in online advertising platforms. Two motivating scenarios are: collaborative bidding among…
In mechanism design it is typical to impose incentive compatibility and then derive an optimal mechanism subject to this constraint. By replacing the incentive compatibility requirement with the goal of minimizing expected ex post regret,…
We analyze how firms should design wage contracts when workers collaborate in teams and effort costs depend on colleagues through a peer network. Performance-based compensation generates incentives that cascade through the organization,…
Principal agent games are a growing area of research which focuses on the optimal behaviour of a principal and an agent, with the former contracting work from the latter, in return for providing a monetary award. While this field…
A striking limitation of human cognition is our inability to execute some tasks simultaneously. Recent work suggests that such limitations can arise from a fundamental tradeoff in network architectures that is driven by the sharing of…