Related papers: Distributionally Robust Contract Design with Defer…

This paper proposes a novel continuous-time dynamic contract framework that has a risk-limiting capability. If a principal and an agent enter into such a contract, the principal can optimally manage its performance and risk with a guarantee…

This paper considers the hidden-action model of the principal-agent problem, in which a principal incentivizes an agent to work on a project using a contract. We investigate whether contracts with bounded payments are learnable and…

In this work, we study sequential contracts under matroid constraints. In the sequential setting, an agent can take actions one by one. After each action, the agent observes the stochastic value of the action and then decides which action…

We study a sequential mechanism design problem in which a principal seeks to elicit truthful reports from multiple rational agents while starting with no prior knowledge of agents' beliefs. We introduce Distributionally Robust Adaptive…

We analyze a two-period principal-agent model in which the principal faces a budget constraint, and the agent's private costs of performing tasks across the two periods may be correlated. We examine the optimal design of the reward scheme…

This paper addresses the transmission network expansion planning problem under uncertain demand and generation capacity. A two-stage adaptive robust optimization framework is adopted whereby the worst-case operating cost is accounted for…

In performative stochastic optimization, decisions can influence the distribution of random parameters, rendering the data-generating process itself decision-dependent. In practice, decision-makers rarely have access to the true…

We consider a continuous time Principal-Agent model on a finite time horizon, where we look for the existence of an optimal contract both parties agreed on. Contrary to the main stream, where the principal is modelled as risk-neutral, we…

We study a natural application of contract design in the context of sequential exploration problems. In our principal-agent setting, a search task is delegated to an agent. The agent performs a sequential exploration of $n$ boxes, suffers…

We investigate the probabilistic feasibility of randomized solutions to two distinct classes of uncertain multi-agent optimization programs. We first assume that only the constraints of the program are affected by uncertainty, while the…

This paper deals with a problem of production planning, which is a version of the capacitated single-item lot sizing problem with backordering under demand uncertainty, modeled by uncertain cumulative demands. The well-known interval…

The distributionally robust Markov Decision Process (MDP) approach asks for a distributionally robust policy that achieves the maximal expected total reward under the most adversarial distribution of uncertain parameters. In this paper, we…

A distributed nonsmooth robust resource allocation problem with cardinality constrained uncertainty is investigated in this paper. The global objective is consisted of local objectives, which are convex but nonsmooth. Each agent is…

Distributionally robust optimization is used to tackle decision making problems under uncertainty where the distribution of the uncertain data is ambiguous. Many ambiguity sets have been proposed for continuous uncertainty that build on…

We study the consequences of information asymmetries and misaligned incentives in settings with multiple independent agents. We model an interaction between a Sender, who holds vital private information but cannot act, and a Receiver, who…

In many game-theoretic settings, agents are challenged with taking decisions against the uncertain behavior exhibited by others. Often, this uncertainty arises from multiple sources, e.g., incomplete information, limited computation,…

We study the cyclic inventory routing problem that involves joint decisions on vehicle routing and inventory replenishment on an infinite, cyclic horizon. It considers a single warehouse and a set of geographically dispersed retailers. We…

We present a continuous-time contract whereby a top-level player can incentivize a hierarchy of players below him to act in his best interest despite only observing the output of his direct subordinate. This paper extends Sannikov's…

We consider the principal-agent problem with heterogeneous agents. Previous works assume that the principal signs independent incentive contracts with every agent to make them invest more efforts on the tasks. However, in many…

In this paper, we consider a distributionally robust resource planning model inspired by a real-world service industry problem. In this problem, there is a mixture of known demand and uncertain future demand. Prior to having full knowledge…